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This Article argues that the structure of the plea-bargaining system—
which the Supreme Court recently recognized “is the criminal justice 
system”—hinges on something previously unappreciated by scholars and 
unaddressed in criminal procedure doctrine: prosecutors’ motives.  This 
Article addresses that problem by studying the prosecutor’s disclosure 
obligations when defendants plead guilty.  Courts and commentators have 
been divided for years over whether Brady v. Maryland applies when 
defendants plead guilty.  But the current split blinds us to more important, 
and more vexing, aspects of the problem.  The fact is, there already is a 
disclosure obligation, albeit a hidden one.  Armed with an understanding of 
the dormant disclosure obligation, this Article then addresses tricky issues 
surrounding this problem and, in doing so, exposes the centrality of 
prosecutorial motives, which existing scholarship has not addressed.  A full 
understanding of the role of prosecutorial motives in the plea-bargaining 
system solves several existing doctrinal puzzles—chief among them whether 
defendants can waive their right to disclosure—yields workable definitions of 
concepts like “impeachment” and “materiality,” and addresses issues that 
go to the heart of the plea-bargaining system. 
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What role do prosecutors’ motives play in constitutional criminal 
procedure?  Scholars have written much about what those motives are.1  But 
they are virtually ignored in criminal procedure doctrine. 2  In this Article, I 
seek to close that gap by showing how a proper account of prosecutorial 
motives can solve a difficult problem in criminal procedure: prosecutors’ 
disclosure obligations when a defendant pleads guilty.  I develop such an 
account by beginning with the question: whether prosecutors must disclose 
material exculpatory evidence prior to the entry of a guilty plea—rather than 
before a trial.  This question has divided courts and commentators for at least 
twenty-five years.3  
I argue that the current split among courts and commentators blinds us to 
more important, and more vexing, aspects of the problem.  The fact is, 
prosecutors already have a disclosure obligation.  In some jurisdictions, 
courts affirmatively hold that the disclosure obligation exists; in the rest, it is 
hidden.  But once we look at a wider cross-section of criminal procedure 
doctrine, the disclosure obligation comes into view—and so do more 
pressing questions.  I argue that we should get beyond the dispute over 
whether Brady v. Maryland 4 applies at the guilty plea stage and turn to the 
important questions of how to administer the more general disclosure 
obligation during plea bargaining and whether the right to disclosure can be 
waived. After uncovering the hidden disclosure obligation, I offer a first cut 
at answering those important questions.  And, I argue that the answers have 
much to tell us about waiver law and disclosure law in criminal procedure.  
That discussion leads me to the Article’s main argument: that the legitimacy 
of the plea-bargaining system hinges heavily—if counterintuitively—on what 
the prosecutor is probably trying to accomplish by offering a given bargain.  
By focusing narrowly on the debate over whether Brady applies to plea 
bargaining, scholars have missed the important questions of prosecutorial 
motives in the process.  
This Article begins with the puzzles of current doctrine.  Under Brady, 
prosecutors must disclose all material, exculpatory information5 known to the 
                                                
1  E.g., HENRY R. GLICK, COURTS, POLITICS, AND JUSTICE 234 (3d ed. 1993); 
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 43, 50–51 (1988). 
2  See infra Part II.D. 
3  See infra.  
4  373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
5  Id. at 87. 
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prosecutor or another government agent6 in time for reasonable use at trial.7  
But criminal convictions almost always result from guilty pleas.8  And, when 
a defendant pleads guilty, the Supreme Court has held that he waives the 
right to complain about constitutional violations that predate the plea.9  Thus, 
while the law purports to protect defendants’ Due Process right to disclosure, 
that right is waived by the routine procedures that make up the overwhelming 
majority10 of criminal convictions.  The Supreme Court last addressed the 
question of disclosure in plea bargaining in United States v. Ruiz,11 in which 
it held that the prosecution has no obligation to disclose “material 
impeachment evidence”12 prior to the entry of a guilty plea.  But the Court 
did not say anything about non-impeachment exculpatory evidence, and 
lower courts remain divided on the question. 
I argue that prosecutors already have to disclose at least some 
exculpatory information before making a plea bargain with a defendant.  I do 
not mean that they should have to disclose this information, or that I think 
that requiring them to do so would be the appropriate resolution of the 
current split of authority.  Rather, I mean that, as a matter of well-settled 
constitutional doctrine, prosecutors do have to disclose exculpatory 
information prior to a guilty plea, lest the plea be overturned later on.  This 
obligation arises from the interaction of two settled, but largely overlooked, 
criminal-procedure rules.  The first holds that you can vacate a guilty plea on 
the ground that you could not be convicted of the crime.13  The second holds 
that you can enter a guilty plea for which neither you nor the prosecution has 
produced any evidence of a factual basis of guilt.14  Combined, these two 
principles prove that you can plead guilty if you know that you cannot be 
convicted, but you cannot plead guilty if you do not know that you cannot be 
convicted.  This creates a right to disclosure: to ensure the validity of a guilty 
plea for a defendant who could not otherwise be convicted, the prosecution 
must disclose the information proving that fact to the defendant.  The 
                                                
6  Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 421–22 (1995) (police); Pennsylvania v. 
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 43 (1987) (children and family services).  
7  E.g., Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 100 (2d Cir. 2001).  
8   See U.S. District Judge John L. Kane, Plea Bargaining and the Innocent, The 
Marshall Project, https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/26/plea-bargaining-
and-the-innocent#.nA70cqUVe [https://perma.cc/GZU5-Q658] (“Ninety-seven 
percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the 
results of guilty pleas”). 
9  E.g., Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973).  
10  E.g., Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat 
Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1118–19 (2011). 
11  536 U.S. 622 (2002). 
12  Id. at 633.  
13  Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998). 
14  E.g., Meyers v. Gillis, 93 F.3d 1147, 1153 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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disclosure obligation has been there all along—hiding behind the Brady 
question that the Court declined to answer in Ruiz.  
In Part I, I discuss how lower courts have dealt with this issue after Ruiz.  
I argue that the split among them inheres only in how they talk about and 
administer the disclosure obligation—not in whether or not it exists.  
In Part II, I consider whether defendants can waive the right to pre-plea 
disclosure in exchange for a lower sentence.  The crucial question in a 
system dominated by plea bargaining is not whether you have a given right, 
but what that right is worth to you in the bargaining process.  First, I offer a 
model of the plea-bargaining process that shows why this question is so 
important.  I then conclude that this is one of those rare criminal procedure 
rights that cannot be waived in exchange for a lower sentence.  The reason 
for this conclusion is surprisingly simple: the prosecution usually cannot 
point to a good reason why it would want to withhold non-impeachment 
Brady evidence other than to try to convince someone to accept a deal that 
she would not otherwise accept.  The same conclusion does not follow with 
either impeachment evidence or inculpatory evidence.  Relying on the fact 
that a disclosure obligation already exists, I argue that, given the correct 
definition of impeachment and materiality, prosecutorial motives explain 
why the right to non-impeachment exculpatory evidence cannot be waived in 
exchange for a lower sentence.   
This conclusion produces sensible answers to the remaining questions 
about guilty-plea disclosures: namely, a definition of impeachment and a 
standard for materiality.  I address these issues, respectively, in Parts III and 
IV.  Part I’s conclusions also point towards a subtle, but important change in 
materiality doctrine across many other Brady problems—that courts should 
focus on prosecutors more than defendants when analyzing Brady questions.   
Finally, I conclude by discussing what this case study says about the 
meaning of a plea of “guilty.”  Some jurists and commentators consistently 
say that a plea of guilty must mean that the defendant is, in fact, guilty.15  
Under this interpretation, evidence tending to contradict the defendant’s guilt 
is necessarily sidelined, and a claim that a defendant’s guilty plea was unfair 
because he was not advised of material exculpatory evidence must be wrong.  
But other jurists and commentators recognize that pleas of guilty often result 
from bargains made to avoid the risk of a conviction, even if that conviction 
would be wrongful.16  By arguing that prosecutors already must disclose 
exculpatory evidence to defendants pleading guilty, this Article reveals that a 
                                                
15  See Poventud v. City of New York, 750 F.3d 121, 165 (2d Cir. 2014) (en 
banc) (Livingston, J., dissenting) (“A ‘counseled plea of guilty is an admission of 
factual guilt so reliable . . . that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly 
removes the issue of factual guilt from the case.’” (quoting Menna v. New York, 423 
U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975)).  
16  Id. at 142–43 (Lynch, J., concurring).  
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guilty plea is not a definitive waiver of a defendant’s right to argue his 
innocence.  
This Article’s broader goal is to elucidate a deeper connection between 
the disclosure question and other recurring problems in criminal procedure 
doctrine.  And, in doing so, the article seeks a modest, but crucial 
reorientation of criminal-procedure scholarship, expanding the spotlight to 
include prosecutors alongside defense counsel in the analysis of plea 
bargaining questions.  
 
I.  THE DORMANT DISCLOSURE OBLIGATION 
 
Courts and commentators keep asking if Brady applies when defendants 
plead guilty.17  Most courts say it does.18  Plenty say it doesn’t.19  New 
                                                
17  E.g. Farr v. State, 124 So. 3d 766, 779 n.17 (Fla. 2012). 
18  United States v. Ohiri, 133 F. App’x 555, 562 (10th Cir. 2005); McCann v. 
Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 788 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Ruiz indicates a significant 
distinction between impeachment information and exculpatory evidence of actual 
innocence. Given this distinction, it is highly likely that the Supreme Court would 
find a violation of the Due Process Clause if prosecutors or other relevant 
government actors have knowledge of a criminal defendant’s factual innocence but 
fail to disclose such information to a defendant before he enters into a guilty plea.”); 
United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 816 n.1 (3rd. Cir. 2001) (assuming in dicta, 
but not holding, “that Brady may require the government to turn over exculpatory 
information prior to entry of a guilty plea”); United States v. Persico, 164 F.3d 796, 
804 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998);  
Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1995);  Tate v. Wood, 963 
F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 1992); Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1320 (2d Cir. 1988); 
United States v. Nelson, 979 F. Supp. 2d 123, 130 (D.D.C. 2013), reconsideration 
denied, 59 F. Supp. 3d 15 (D.D.C. 2014), and  appeal dismissed, No. 13-3108, 2014 
WL 3013970 (D.C. Cir. June 17, 2014); United States v. Danzi, 726 F. Supp. 2d. 
120, 126 (D. Conn. 2010); Hill v. West, 599 F. Supp. 2d 371, 379 (W.D.N.Y. 2009); 
State v. Huebler, 275 P.3d 91, 93 (Nev. 2012); Hyman v. State, 723 S.E.2d 375, 380 
(S.C. 2012); In re Miranda, 182 P.3d 513 (Cal. 2008); State v. Harris, 680 N.W.2d 
737, 750 n.15 (Wis. 2004) (“The State asks us to go one step further and overrule the 
court of appeals’ decision in State v. Sturgeon, 605 N.W.2d 589 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1999) [holding that there is a Brady right at a guilty plea]. We decline to do so.”) 
Wallar v. State, 403 S.W.3d 698, 707 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).  
19  Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 154 (2d. Cir. 2010) (choosing in dicta not to 
address the issue); United States v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 2009); 
United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 472 (4th Cir. 2004); Matthew v. Johnson, 
201 F.3d 353, 361–62 (5th Cir. 2000); White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416, 421–22 
(8th Cir. 1988); Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314, 319 (6th Cir. 1985); Cook v. 
Romanowski, No. 2:12–10383, 2014 WL 859846, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2014) 
(right not “clearly established”); United States v. McLean, 419 F. App’x 473, 475 
(5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
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York’s appellate court says both.20  Almost all commentators think Brady 
applies.21  One thinks that it does not, but that prosecutors’ non-constitutional 
obligations ought to require them to disclose exculpatory evidence.22  And, 
one commentator is against requiring prosecutors to disclose exculpatory 
evidence.23  In this Section I hope to show that this debate overlooks an 
important feature of this problem: prosecutors already have to disclose some 
exculpatory information during plea bargaining. 
The law is clear that if certain information comes to light after the entry 
of a guilty plea, the defendant can vacate the plea.  But the law is also clear 
that—as a constitutional matter24—defendants can strike deals with the 
                                                
20  Compare People v. Philips, 817 N.Y.S.2d 373, 373 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 
2006) (pleading guilty waives the right to Brady disclosures), with People v. 
Delarosa, 851 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2008) (guilty plea 
doesn’t waive the right to Brady disclosures); People v. Martin, 669 N.Y.S.2d 268, 
271 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1998) (higher materiality standard); People v. Ortiz, 
515 N.Y.S.2d 317, 319 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1987); see also People v. Armer, 
501 N.Y.S.2d 203, 205 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1986) (plea upheld where 
defendant failed to prove a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded 
guilty had the Brady material been furnished); People v. Benard, 620 N.Y.S.2d 242 
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1994). 
21   Corinna Barret Lain, Accuracy Where It Matters: Brady v. Maryland in the 
Plea Bargaining Context, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 5 (2002); Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting 
Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 484 (2009) (arguing for a “prophylactic 
rule” to supersede Brady’s materiality requirement); R. Michael Cassidy, Plea 
Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem of Impeachment Disclosures, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 1427, 1476 (2011); Russell D. Covey, Plea-Bargaining Law After 
Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 595, 609, 610 (2013); Kevin C. McMunigal, Guilty 
Pleas, Brady Disclosure, and Wrongful Convictions, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 651, 
652 (2007) [hereinafter McMunigal, Wrongful Convictions]; Mary Prosser, 
Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to New Realities, 
2006 WIS. L. REV. 541, 569 (2006); Gerard Fowke, Note, Material to Whom?: 
Implementing Brady’s Duty to Disclose at Trial and During Plea Bargaining, 50 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 575, 590 (2013); Michael Nasser Petegorsky, Note, Plea 
Bargaining in the Dark: The Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Brady Evidence During 
Plea Bargaining, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3599, 3650 (2013); Note, The Prosecutor’s 
Duty to Disclose to Defendants Pleading Guilty, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1004, 1004 
(1986); see also Samuel R. Wiseman, Waiving Innocence, 96 MINN. L. REV. 952, 
994 (2012).  
22  Erica Hashimoto, Toward Ethical Plea Bargaining, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 949, 
949 (2008). 
23  John G. Douglass, Can Prosecutors Bluff? Brady v. Maryland and Plea 
Bargaining, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581 (2007) [hereinafter Douglass, Can 
Prosecutors Bluff?]; John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of 
Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437 (2001) [hereinafter Douglass, Fatal 
Attraction?].  
24 Plenty of non-constitutional rules require a factual basis for guilt prior to the 
entry of a guilty plea.  E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a).  
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prosecution to plead guilty to crimes that everyone knows they did not 
commit.  This is often done to tailor the charges so that the court can impose 
a sentence that both the defense and the prosecution would agree to, but that 
the court could not impose if the crimes actually committed were charged 
and proven.  
This Section proceeds in four parts.  First, I explain that many of the 
courts that don’t apply Brady when a defendant pleads guilty still recognize a 
disclosure obligation under a different name.  Next, I hope to show that this 
is, in fact, consistent with long-settled constitutional doctrine.  The doctrinal 
argument goes as follows.  First, you can’t plead guilty to a crime you 
couldn’t be convicted of if you don’t know you couldn’t be convicted of it.25  
Second, you can plead guilty to a crime you couldn’t be convicted of if you 
do know you couldn’t be convicted of it.  Therefore, if the prosecution 
discloses all its material exculpatory information prior to your guilty plea, 
that plea might be immune from attack;26 but if the prosecution doesn’t, your 
plea is vulnerable to constitutional challenge.  The prosecution must disclose 
at least some material exculpatory information prior to a guilty plea.  The 
fighting questions will be whether you can waive the right to this disclosure, 
what impeachment and materiality mean in this context, and how this works 
with existing doctrine. 
 
A. The Dormant Disclosure Obligation in Practice 
 
Courts are split on whether Brady applies to a guilty plea.  In this 
Section, I hope to convince you that many courts that have held that Brady 
does not apply to guilty pleas impose disclosure obligations in practice.  The 
purpose of this exercise is to show that, whatever courts and commentators 
say elsewhere, there is, in fact, at least some disclosure obligation.  
States and federal circuits can be divided as follows.  First, there are the 
courts that recognize a Brady obligation and call it one.27  Before Ruiz, which 
                                                
25 What I mean here is crimes that you don’t know you could not be convicted 
of.  I don’t mean to be referring to the problem of defendants pleading guilty to 
crimes that they truly do not know they did not commit by virtue of their intoxication 
at the time or loss of memory.  See McMunigal, Wrongful Convictions, supra note 
21.  I mean crimes that defendants cannot be convicted of, regardless of their private 
knowledge of their guilt or innocence.  I am going to use the two formulations 
interchangeably until a need to distinguish them arises.  The need will arise later.  
26 I say “might be” here because, of course, there could be exculpatory evidence 
that neither the prosecutor nor the defendant knows about.  Disclosure, then, is a 
necessary—but not a sufficient—condition to a valid guilty plea.  For our purposes, 
though, this does not matter.  If the prosecutor does not disclose this information, the 
plea will be overturned if the information comes out.  
27  United States v. Ohiri, 133 F. App’x 555, 560 (10th Cir. 2005); McCann v. 
Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 
811, 816 n.1 (3rd. Cir. 2001); United States v. Persico, 164 F.3d 796, 804–05 (2d 
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held that prosecutors do not have to turn over impeachment evidence when a 
defendant pleads guilty, these courts took one of two doctrinal routes to the 
conclusion that Brady applies.  The first camp concluded that a Brady 
violation renders a guilty plea unintelligent.28  The second camp concluded 
that a Brady claim (like an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim) was not 
waived by the entry of a guilty plea where the Brady violation itself 
contributed to the plea, and that the claim accordingly survived intact.29  The 
third camp held that Brady did not apply to a guilty plea.30 
After Ruiz, those courts that had declined to apply Brady to a guilty plea 
in the first place simply reasoned that Ruiz had not altered that conclusion.31  
Those that did apply Brady in the first place read Ruiz closely—why would 
the Court restrict its holding to impeachment evidence, they reason, if not to 
suggest a contradistinction with other exculpatory evidence?32 
But three of the courts that have held that Brady does not apply to guilty 
pleas end up finding disclosure obligations that look a lot like Brady.  
                                                                                                               
Cir. 1999); United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 254–55 (2d Cir. 1998); Sanchez 
v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1995); Tate v. Wood, 963 F.2d 20, 24 
(2d Cir. 1992); Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1321 (2d Cir. 1988); United States 
v. Nelson, 979 F. Supp. 2d 123, 126 (D.D.C. 2013), reconsideration denied, 59 F. 
Supp. 3d 15 (D.D.C. 2014), and  appeal dismissed, No. 13-3108, 2014 WL 3013970 
(D.C. Cir. June 17, 2014); United States v. Danzi, 726 F. Supp. 2d. 120, 123–24 (D. 
Conn. 2010); Hill v. West, 599 F. Supp. 2d 371, 379 (W.D.N.Y. 2009); State v. 
Huebler, 275 P.3d 91, 93 (Nev. 2012); Hyman v. State, 723 S.E.2d 375, 380 (S.C. 
2012); In re Miranda, 182 P.3d 513, 545 (Cal. 2008); State v. Harris, 680 N.W.2d 
737, 750 n.15 (Wis. 2004) (“The State asks us to go one step further and overrule the 
court of appeals’ decision in State v. Sturgeon, 605 N.W.2d 589 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1999) [holding that there is a Brady right at a guilty plea]. We decline to do so.”) 
Wallar v. State, 403 S.W.3d 698, 707 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).  
28  See Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453 (“A waiver cannot be deemed ‘intelligent and 
voluntary’ if ‘entered without knowledge of material information withheld by the 
prosecution.’”) ([mis]quoting Miller, 848 F.2d at 1320).  Professor Douglass notes 
that this quote was actually taken out of context.  Douglass, Fatal Attraction?, supra 
note 23, at 517 n.118. 
29  Douglass, Fatal Attraction?, supra note 23, at 517. 
30  E.g., supra note 19. 
31  Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 154 (2d. Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Conroy, 567 F.3d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 
453, 472 (4th Cir. 2004).  
32  E.g., McCann, 337 F.3d at 788 (“Ruiz indicates a significant distinction 
between impeachment information and exculpatory evidence of actual innocence.”); 
Nelson, 979 F.2d at 128 (“The Supreme Court held that ‘the Constitution does not 
require the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering 
a plea agreement with a criminal defendant.’ But the Court found that providing 
information establishing the defendant’s factual innocence helped allay concerns 
about the absence of merely impeachment information.” (quoting Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 
633)).    
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Consider the First Circuit, the Fourth Circuit, and the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts.  In the First Circuit’s case, the same judge (Judge Selya) 
wrote both the opinion establishing that Brady does not apply to guilty pleas 
and the opinion establishing that prosecutors have to turn over at least some 
material exculpatory information.33  Even courts that do not recognize a 
Brady obligation find themselves doing things an awful lot like Brady with a 
higher materiality standard.  Their attempts to claim otherwise are difficult to 
square with their other reasoning.  
In United States v. Fisher,34 the Fourth Circuit, which has squarely held 
that Brady does not apply to a guilty plea,35 was asked to set aside a 
defendant’s guilty plea where the defendant was unaware of false statements 
in an application for a search warrant that ultimately lead to the evidence 
convincing him to plead guilty.36  The false statements were made by a cop 
who later pleaded guilty to criminal fraud and who admitted specifically to 
lying about Fisher.37  
The court claimed that the case was not about non-disclosure.  Instead, it 
wrote, “this case centers not on a Brady v. Maryland failure to disclose but 
rather on something categorically different: affirmative 
misrepresentations.”38  But, at some point, withholding information makes 
what you do say misleading.  The difference is one of degree, not of kind.  It 
is uncontroversially misleading to say, “one witness says you committed the 
crime” and fail to disclose that every other witness says otherwise.  And, 
despite claiming not to address the Brady problem, the Fourth Circuit cites 
Sanchez v. United States,39 the leading case at the time establishing a Brady 
obligation attendant to a guilty plea.40  “If a defendant cannot challenge the 
validity of a plea based on subsequently discovered police misconduct,” the 
Fisher court writes, “officers may be more likely to engage in such conduct, 
as well as more likely to conceal it to help elicit guilty pleas.”41  The case 
was about non-disclosure.  
                                                
33  United States v. Mathur, 624 F.3d. 498, 507 (1st Cir. 2010); Ferrara v. United 
States, 456 F.3d. 278, 291 (1st Cir. 2006). 
34  711 F.3d. 460 (2013).  
35  United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 285 (4th Cir. 2010), as amended 
(Feb. 9, 2010) (“The Brady right, however, is a trial right . . . . When a defendant 
pleads guilty, those concerns are almost completely eliminated because his guilt is 
admitted.” (citing Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975)).   
36  Fisher, 711 F.3d. at 460.  
37  Id. at 463. 
38  Id. at 465 n.2.  
39  50 F.3d 1448. 
40  Id. at 1453. 
41  Fisher, 711 F.3d at 469 (quoting Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453 (stating that “if a 
defendant may not raise a Brady [v. Maryland ] claim after a guilty plea, prosecutors 
may be tempted to deliberately withhold exculpatory information as part of an 
attempt to elicit guilty pleas”)).  
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The Fisher court then attempts to distinguish the non-disclosure cases 
(chiefly United States v. Moussaoui 42 ) by arguing that here the non-
disclosure goes to the “heart” of the prosecution’s case.  
 
This case presents highly uncommon circumstances in which 
gross police misconduct goes to the heart of the 
prosecution’s case.  Lunsford [the lying cop] falsely testified 
in his sworn search warrant affidavit that he targeted 
Defendant after a reliable confidential informant told him 
that Defendant distributed narcotics from his residence and 
vehicle and had a handgun in his residence.  Lunsford 
identified the confidential informant in his affidavit, and he 
averred that the informant identified Defendant in a 
photograph and provided Lunsford with Defendant’s 
physical description, address, and vehicle information.  On 
the basis of that affidavit, Lunsford secured a search warrant.  
That warrant enabled the search of Defendant’s home, where 
evidence forming the basis of the charge to which he pled 
guilty was found.  After Defendant was charged, the 
prosecution provided Lunsford’s affidavit to Defendant, who 
relied on it in deciding whether to plead guilty.43 
 
In the quoted passage, the court simultaneously claims that the evidence 
forming the basis of the charge stemmed from the search of the house, not 
the false warrant application, and that the false warrant application was the 
“heart” of the prosecution’s case.  All the while, the court ignored a Supreme 
Court case that would destroy this distinction, and failed to address the 
inquiry that ought to govern its resolution.44  In Haring v. Prosise,45 relying 
on Tollet v. Henderson,46 the Supreme Court held that a guilty plea renders 
irrelevant all Fourth Amendment violations committed prior to its entry.  
“[W]hen a defendant is convicted pursuant to his guilty plea rather than a 
trial, the validity of that conviction cannot be affected by an alleged Fourth 
Amendment violation . . . .”47 
Fisher did not argue that the evidence found in his house was false; he 
argued that the warrant was invalid. 48   His was properly a Fourth 
                                                
42  591 F.3d 263. 
43  Fisher, 711 F.3d at 466 (emphasis added).  
44  See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 321 (1983).  
45  Id.   
46  411 U.S. 258 (1973) (holding that defendant cannot raise claim of 
unconstitutional discrimination in jury selection after pleading guilty even though it 
was impossible for him to have discovered it earlier).  
47  Prosise, 462 U.S. at 321.  
48  Fisher, 711 F.3d at 467.  
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Amendment claim,49 which was waived when he pleaded guilty.  And, even 
if he relied on the bogus affidavit in deciding to plead guilty, as the court 
obliquely claims, no one asked whether he would have pleaded guilty 
anyway given the evidence found in his house (seeing as he waived his right 
to suppress it).  And, although the precise rate of police perjury is unknown, 
and probably unknowable, it is hardly “uncommon” for the police to lie in 
search-warrant applications.50    
The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning fails.  So what’s the court up to?  I think 
they’re finding a disclosure obligation in the face of governing precedent that 
says Brady does not apply to a guilty plea.  
The First Circuit, in Ferrara v. United States, 51  found that the 
government violates a defendant’s rights whenever the government’s non-
disclosure rises to the level of “extreme misconduct.”52   The facts are 
complicated, but, basically, the government failed to disclose that a murder 
witness had recanted his story and that the government then manipulated that 
witness into confirming the prosecution’s version of the story.53  The court 
held this sufficient to satisfy the “misconduct” prong of the voluntariness 
requirement for a plea, which prong allows a defendant to overturn a guilty 
plea that was procured by, essentially, outrageous government conduct.54  
“These egregious circumstances,” the court writes, “make this one of those 
rare instances in which the government’s failure to turn over evidence 
constitutes sufficiently parlous behavior to satisfy the misconduct prong of 
the involuntariness test.”55 
On what axis is the court measuring egregiousness?  The court writes 
that the lying prosecutor, Jeffrey Auerhahn,56 not only failed to turn over the 
                                                
49  See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156 (1978). 
50  E.g., COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND 
THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP’T, CITY OF NEW YORK, 
COMMISSION REPORT 36 (Milton Mollen, Chair 1994) (finding that police perjury 
was “so common in certain precincts that it has spawned its own word: 
‘testilying.’”); see also Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater 
Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 
75, 82 (1992) (finding “a pattern of pervasive police perjury”); I. Bennett Capers, 
Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 837 (2008); Julia Simon-Kerr, 
Systemic Lying, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2175, 2202 (2015); Christopher Slobogin, 
Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1042 
(1996).  
51  456 F.3d 278 (1st Cir. 2006). 
52  Id. at 291.  
53  Id. at 282. 
54  Id. at 297–98. 
55  Id. at 291. 
56  Auerhahn was initially sanctioned for his conduct in this case but eventually 
had those sanctions lifted by a three-judge panel of the District of Massachusetts.  
See David Boeri, Federal Prosecutor Cleared of Charges to Surprise of Some, 
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exculpatory evidence—in this case, the witness’s recantation—but also said 
that the witness would confirm his version of the story.57  On this account, 
egregiousness is measured by how actively the prosecutor involves himself 
in concealing the exculpatory truth.  But if this is “misconduct,” would it not 
be misconduct merely to fail to disclose the witness’s recantation?  Maybe—
and maybe that’s what the court means here.  But I don’t see why that would 
be different from failing to disclose that the would-be witness is a habitual 
perjurer.  Both pieces of concealed information make the witness’s story less 
likely and, without those pieces of information, could plausibly make the rest 
of the tale misleading.  
It seems, then, that egregiousness in the First Circuit’s analysis is at least 
partially a proxy for materiality: where the information withheld is highly 
material, the prosecutor’s failure to disclose it is egregious.  This is Brady 
with a very high materiality standard.  But Judge Selya, who wrote the 
opinion in Ferrara, also wrote the following passage:  
 
The Ruiz Court evinced a reluctance to extend a Brady-like 
right to the realm of pretrial plea negotiations . . . . Ruiz 
teaches that Brady does not protect against the possible 
prejudice that may ensue from the loss of an opportunity to 
plea-bargain with complete knowledge of all relevant facts.  
This makes good sense: when a defendant chooses to admit 
his guilt, Brady concerns subside.58   
 
Judge Selya, then, despite concluding that Brady does not apply to cases in 
which the defendant pleads guilty, finds himself imposing a similar 
obligation on the prosecution.59  
Lastly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently followed 
Ferrara and overturned a defendant’s guilty plea made in reliance on a lab 
report produced by a charlatan, Annie Dookhan, who has since been indicted 
for fabricating lab results and her own qualifications.60  (The First Circuit 
                                                                                                               
WBUR NEWS, Sept. 16, 2011, http://www.wbur.org/2011/09/16/jeffrey-auerhahn-
cleared [https://perma.cc/A3JN-NJNQ] (“[A]cross Boston, some attorneys found the 
panel’s ruling absolutely stunning.  The three judges had chosen to ignore the factual 
findings [that the district court] had made about Auerhahn in 2003.  The judges did 
so even while recognizing that [the district judge] had observed the key witnesses 
firsthand and made thorough findings at the hearings.”).   
57  Ferrara, 456 F.3d at 291. 
58  United States v. Mathur, 624 F.3d. 498, 507 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing United 
States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 285 (4th Cir. 2004); see also Matthew v. 
Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2000) (“The Brady rule’s focus on protecting 
the integrity of trials suggests that where no trial is to occur, there may be no 
constitutional violation.”)).  
59  Ferrara, 456 F.3d at 291–92. 
60  Commonwealth v. Scott, 5 N.E.3d 530, 535, 548 (Mass. 2014). 
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recently considered a Brady claim resulting from her malfeasance.61)  The 
Massachusetts court held that where a defendant can prove that egregious 
government misconduct had a “material influence”62 on his decision to plead 
guilty, the defendant’s plea can be overturned.  The court claimed that 
although Ferrara was indeed about non-disclosure its framework is not so 
limited:  
 
Although the particular form of misconduct in Ferrara was 
the prosecutor’s withholding of exculpatory evidence, the 
court in Ferrara did not limit its framework to cases of 
egregious prosecutorial nondisclosure.  Rather, it set forth a 
general framework for determining whether government 
misconduct of any sort could have been sufficiently 
egregious to render the defendant’s guilty plea involuntary.  
Indeed even if the prosecutor in [this] case had a duty to 
disclose evidence of Dookhan’s wrongdoing as a result of 
the Commonwealth’s constructive knowledge of her actions, 
the failure to disclose this information is in no way as 
egregious as the prosecutor’s conduct in Ferrara, nor is it as 
egregious as the misconduct of Dookhan herself.  Therefore, 
we apply the Ferrara analysis here in light of Dookhan’s 
own misconduct, not the conduct of any other government 
agent.63 
 
Basing the defendant’s relief on the misconduct of the lab technician is 
unusual.  The court claims it stems from the Ferrara analysis, but it’s hard to 
see how.  The court has absolved the prosecution of any wrongdoing—how 
were they supposed to know about the charlatan at the lab?—but, 
nonetheless, provides relief.  If egregious misconduct by any government 
official is sufficient to overturn a guilty plea,64 what is left of the rule in 
Tollet v. Henderson, which holds that a defendant waives his Fourth 
Amendment rights when he pleads guilty?  The court is claiming that 
Dookhan herself was the source of the constitutional violation.65  But if that’s 
the case, and the prosecutor’s conduct has nothing to do with the violation, 
                                                
61  Wilkins v. United States, 754 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2014).  
62  Scott, 5 N.E.3d at 546.  
63  Id. at 541 n.6 (quoting United States v. Wilkins, 943 F. Supp. 2d 248, 257, 
certificate of appealability granted, 948 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D. Mass. 2013) (“It takes no 
leap of imagination to recognize that the government’s ‘suppression’ of 
impeachment evidence concerning Dookhan, [the scope of which it could not have 
been aware of at the time of the pleas,] falls miles short of . . . sufficiently egregious 
misconduct . . . that figured in Ferrara”)). 
64  Scott, 5 N.E.3d at 535. 
65  Id. 
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why isn’t the remedy simply to suppress the chemical test—which sort of 
claim might be covered by Tollet?  It seems, again, that this is a bit like 
Brady in disguise, again with a sky-high materiality standard.  
The three cases I just discussed show that at least three courts that claim 
to deny—or not yet recognize—a Brady obligation attendant to a guilty plea 
really do recognize one, albeit with an extra-high materiality standard.  The 
Fifth Circuit, then, is the outlier—it has yet to find a case falling within the 
scope of Ferrara (or another free-standing due process right) and have a 
square holding that Brady does not apply to a guilty plea.66  But, as the next 
three Sections will show, even the Fifth Circuit is, in fact, bound to apply a 
disclosure obligation. 
Before moving on, though, it is worth briefly pointing out that this 
feature of disclosure law is consistent with Brady’s substantive roots.  Brady 
is a due-process case and, at a certain level, fundamental notions of fairness 
lead courts to overturn guilty pleas where the defendant was unaware of very 
important information.  An outright bluff by an agent of the state is 
essentially intolerable.67  Although, in the Sections that follow, I offer some 
complicated argumentation in the service of a doctrinal justification for this 
rule, the more basic justification retains significant purchase here.  And, as I 
will briefly note in Part I below, the basic justification would also likely hold 
at least some of the right to disclosure to be non-waiveable.  
 
B. You Can’t Plead Guilty if You Don’t Know You’re Not Guilty 
 
In Bousley v. United States,68 the defendant successfully attacked his 
guilty plea on the ground that he did not commit the crime to which he 
                                                
66  Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2000).  (“The Brady rule’s 
focus on protecting the integrity of trials suggests that where no trial is to occur, 
there may be no constitutional violation.”).  
67 Cf. Jennifer E. Laurin, Brady in an Age of Innocence, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 505, 508 (2014) (“Brady itself originally resonated in . . . terms [of 
basic procedural fairness].  In its brief opinion, the Court said next to nothing about 
(obvious) harm to the innocent of prosecutorial withholding of favorable evidence; it 
did, however, extol the virtues of justice-seeking prosecution and elaborated on the 
imperative of fairly won victories.” (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86–88 
(1963)); cf. also Brady, 373 U.S. at 87–88 (“Society wins not only when the guilty 
are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of 
justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.  An inscription on the walls of 
the Department of Justice states the proposition candidly for the federal domain: The 
United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.  A 
prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made 
available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that 
bears heavily on the defendant.  That casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect 
of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice.” (footnote omitted)).  
68  523 U.S. 614 (1998).  
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pleaded guilty.69  And when he pleaded guilty, he did not know—and could 
not have known—that he could not be convicted of the crime.70  This case 
establishes that you can’t plead guilty to a crime for which you could not be 
convicted, if you do not know that you could not be convicted.71  
Bousley is a weird case.  Mr. Bousley pleaded guilty to “using” a gun in 
a drug crime in violation of the now-notorious 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1),72 in a 
circuit (the Eighth) that, at the time, interpreted the statute to require only 
possession of the gun at the scene.73  Bousley sought habeas relief.74  The 
district court denied the writ and Bousley appealed.75  While his appeal was 
pending, the Supreme Court, in Bailey v. United States,76 held that the statute 
to which Bousley pleaded guilty required “active employment of the 
firearm.”77  Bousley’s guilty-plea colloquy had established only that he 
possessed the gun at the scene of the drug crime.78  There was no evidence 
that he actively employed it.79  
Justice Rehnquist, for the Court, held that Bousley could collaterally 
attack his guilty plea on the ground that it was not voluntary and intelligent if 
he could show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that no reasonable juror 
would have convicted him of the charged offense, nor of any higher offense 
from which he may have bargained down.80  Bousley established that actual 
innocence can overturn a guilty plea where the defendant was not aware that 
he was innocent.81  
                                                
69  Id. at 624. 
70  Id. at 616. 
71  Id. at 616, 624. 
72  The statute has generated bizarre litigation on the meaning of “us[e].” 
Compare Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993) (trading a gun for drugs 
counts), with Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74 (2007) (trading drugs for a gun 
does not).  
73  Bousley, 523 U.S. at 614.  
74  Id. at 617. 
75  Id.  
76  516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995). 
77  Id. 
78   Bousley, 523 U.S. at 614. 
79   Id at 617. 
80  Id. at 624 (“It is important to note in this regard that ‘actual innocence’ means 
factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency. In other words, the Government is 
not limited to the existing record to rebut any showing that petitioner might make.  
Rather, on remand, the Government should be permitted to present any admissible 
evidence of petitioner’s guilt even if that evidence was not presented during 
petitioner’s plea colloquy and would not normally have been offered before our 
decision in Bailey.  In cases where the Government has forgone more serious charges 
in the course of plea bargaining, petitioner’s showing of actual innocence must also 
extend to those charges.”) (quoting Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992) 
(footnote omitted)).   
81   Id, at 623.  
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Maybe I’m over reading Bousley, you might think.  Isn’t this just a case 
about retroactivity?  On a certain jurisprudential view, the law simply 
changed between Bousley’s conviction and his Supreme Court case.  Maybe 
this change was the operative fact in Bousley.  If this is true, actual innocence 
alone is not enough; one must show some additional reason (like an interim 
change in the law) that caused the erroneous guilty plea.  And, the major 
premise of my argument—that you can’t plead guilty to a crime you can’t be 
convicted of if you don’t know you can’t be convicted of it—fails for lack of 
generality.  Sure, you can plead guilty to most crimes you don’t know you 
can’t be convicted of (and stay in jail after we find out about it), just not 
when the cause was an interim change in Supreme Court law, or something 
like it.  
A couple points are sufficient to dismiss this objection.  First, consider 
Justice Stevens, concurring in Bousley.  He treats the Court’s holding on the 
meaning of the statute as a timeless judicial proclamation.  “A judicial 
construction of a statute,” he writes, “is an authoritative statement of what 
the statute meant before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to 
that construction.”82   The rest of the Court appears to agree with this 
contention.  The Court does not view cases like Bailey as changes in the 
law—rather, they are statements of what the law always was.83  
Similarly, other Supreme Court cases confirm that doctrinal changes 
between trial and appeal are neither necessary nor sufficient to invalidate 
convictions based on earlier rules of law.  For example, compare Bousley 
with Lockhart v. Fretwell.84  In Fretwell, the Court said that a defendant is 
not prejudiced for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel purposes if his lawyer 
fails to raise a defense that would have been successful at the time of the trial 
but has since been invalidated by a circuit court.85   Mr. Fretwell was 
sentenced to death because his trial lawyer, Bill Vehick,86 failed to raise a 
double-counting defense, which forbade the use of an element of the crime to 
aggravate the offense for capital-sentencing purposes.87  The no-double-
counting rule, under Eighth Circuit law at the time of trial, would have 
spared Fretwell the death penalty.88  But the Eighth Circuit invalidated the 
                                                
82  Id. at 626 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 
511 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1994)).  
83  No need to get into the jurisprudential implications of all of this.  Whatever 
one’s take on the meaning of the word “law” in the text above, the Court’s view is 
that this is not a case about only retroactivity, and that’s all we need for the moment.  
84  506 U.S. 364 (1993).  
85   Id. at 366.   
86  While researching another paper, I spoke with Mr. Fretwell’s counsel in the 
Supreme Court, Ricky Reed Medlock of Arkadelphia, Arkansas. Mr. Medlock said 
he’d remember Vehik’s name for the rest of his life.  See Telephone Conversation 
with Ricky Reed Medlock, July 31, 2012 (notes on file with author).  
87  Id. 
88  Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 379.  
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rule between Fretwell’s trial and his habeas appeal.89  The Court held that 
Fretwell was not entitled to relief.90  
  If Bousley were just about retroactivity—if an interim change in the law 
were necessary or sufficient to get relief—Fretwell would be anomalous in 
the extreme.  Fretwell is a case where the law clearly did change in the 
interim, and yet no relief.  Rather, I think that Bousley stands for the simple 
proposition that you cannot plead guilty to a crime you can’t be convicted of 
if you do not know you can’t be convicted of it.  After Bousley, then, 
notwithstanding the persistent dictum that “[a guilty plea] may not be 
collaterally attacked,”91  we know that a guilty plea can be collaterally 
attacked on the ground that the defendant couldn’t be convicted of the crime 
to which she pleaded guilty.  But this holds true, as I’ll show in the next 
Section, unless the defendant knew that she could not be convicted of the 
crime to which she pleaded guilty.  
This is a high standard.  Under Bousley, a guilty plea is invalid only if 
the defendant can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he did not 
commit the crime to which he pleaded guilty.92  This requires considerably 
more than the ordinary Brady claim does.  But that is not the point here.  The 
point here is that the Court has recognized that a defendant’s guilty plea is 
invalid where he did not commit, and was not aware that he did not commit, 
the crime to which he pleaded guilty.  And, as will become very important in 
the next Section, the defendant did not plead down to the crime from some 
other crime he did commit.  
The Bousley rule requires only that the defendant know that he could not 
be convicted; it does not require that anyone in particular tell him so.  
Prosecutorial disclosure of actual innocence, then, is necessary to a 
constitutionally sound guilty plea; it is not sufficient.  In Bousley itself, the 
prosecutor and the defendant were equally unaware that the defendant could 
not be convicted.93  Strictly speaking the defendant has a right to know a 
certain fact, not a right to be told a certain fact.  This accords with Brady 
more generally, which, on the prevailing interpretation, requires disclosure as 
                                                
89  Collins v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 258, 268 (8th Cir. 1985). 
90  Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 366. 
91  Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1985) (citing Tollett v. Henderson, 411 
U.S. 258, 266–67 (1973); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970); Parker 
v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 797–98 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 
759, 772 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747–48 (1970); see also 
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976); Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 
(1975) (per curiam)).  
92  Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 624 (1998). 
93  Id. at 618, 624. 
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a prophylactic measure to ensure that the defendant knows the evidence in 
support of his defense.94      
 
C. You Can Plead Guilty if You Do Know You’re Not Guilty 
 
If everyone involved knows that you did not commit the crime to which 
you are pleading guilty, there is, as a matter of existing constitutional law, no 
problem with the court entering your plea and sending you to prison.  This is 
likely a surprising proposition for some readers,95 so I’ll dwell on it a bit.  
But courts across the country have been very clear—as long as your plea is 
voluntary, you can plead guilty to a crime you did not commit.  
Courts have consistently held that a factual basis for a guilty plea is not 
constitutionally required. 96   Consider Professor LaFave’s example. 97  
Imagine a statutory regime in which burglary at night has a mandatory 
fifteen-year sentence, but burglary during the day—which requires that the 
burglary not be committed at night—has a five-year sentence.  As a 
constitutional matter, a defendant can plead guilty to burglary during the day 
even as he says the crime was committed at night.  New York courts actually 
take this a step further: they permit defendants to plead guilty to non-existent 
crimes.98  All these courts are entering pleas to crimes that everyone knows 
the defendant did not commit.  
                                                
94  Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Bush, Obama and Beyond: Observations on the 
Prospect of Fact Checking Executive Department Threat Claims Before the Use of 
Force, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 433, 476 n.186 (2010) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 
U.S. 419, 439 (1995) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935))).  
95  Judge Wilkinson, for example, wrongly universalizes the federal experience 
and concludes that “[t]he requirement that courts assure themselves that guilty pleas 
possess a factual basis further undermines the attempt to discredit the plea bargaining 
system with the specter of innocents pleading guilty.” J. Harvie Wilkinson, In 
Defense of American Criminal Justice, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1099, 1141 (2014).   
96  See 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET. AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.4(f) n.242 (4th 
ed. 2015) (citing Loftis v. Almager, 704 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 2012); Meyers v. Gillis, 
93 F.3d 1147 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. McGlocklin, 8 F.3d 1037 (6th Cir.  
1993); Stewart v. Peters, 958 F.2d 1379 (7th Cir. 1992); Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 
697 (5th Cir. 1986); Willbright v. Smith, 745 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1984); People v. 
Hoffard, 899 P.2d 896 (Cal. 1995); Lacy v. People, 775 P.2d 1 (Colo.1989); Paulsen 
v. Manson, 525 A.2d 1315 (Conn. 1987); State v. Cooper, 636 S.E.2d 493 (Ga. 
2006); McDonough v. Weber, 859 N.W.2d 26 (S.D. 2015); State ex rel. Farmer v. 
Trent, 551 S.E.2d 711 (W. Va. 2001)). 
97  See LAFAVE ET. AL., supra note 96, § 21.4(f) n.242. 
98  Id. § 21.4(f) n.235 (“People v. Foster, [19 N.Y.2d 150 (N.Y. 1967)], Foster 
has been applied so as to (i) allow a plea to a technically nonexistent crime, as in 
People v. Martinez, [81 N.Y.2d 810 (N.Y. 1993)] (attempt to commit crime which is 
committed without intent); and (ii) allow a plea to a lesser crime technically 
inconsistent with the crime charge[d], as in People v. Adams, [57 N.Y.2d 1035 (N.Y. 
1982)] (plea to manslaughter in satisfaction of felony-murder count).”). 
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The key here is that everyone, including the defendant, knows what the 
deal is, and knows that the defendant did something he wasn’t supposed to 
do.  State v. Zhao99 is instructive.  There, the Supreme Court of Washington 
upheld a plea “to amended charges for which there [was] no factual basis, but 
only [because] the record establishe[d] that the defendant [pleaded] 
knowingly and voluntarily and that there at least exist[ed] a factual basis for 
the original charge.”100  This principle extends to pleas to higher charges for 
which conviction is impossible,101 a plea one would presumably make only to 
avoid being charged with a still more serious crime.  As long as the 
defendant does so with the knowledge that he’s not guilty of the charged 
crime, and there is at least some reason to believe he committed some other 
crime—this distinction will be crucial in Part II—he can plead guilty 
regardless of whether he is or isn’t guilty.  
Justice Scalia thought that Bousley itself invalidated pleas without factual 
bases.  Dissenting in Bousley, he wrote:  
 
Under today’s holding, a defendant who is the “wheel-man” 
in a bank robbery in which a person is shot and killed, and 
who pleads guilty in state court to the offense of voluntary 
manslaughter in order to avoid trial on felony-murder 
charges, is entitled to federal habeas review of his contention 
that his guilty plea was “involuntary” because he was not 
advised that intent to kill was an element of the 
manslaughter offense, and that he was “actually innocent” of 
manslaughter because he had no intent to kill.102 
 
Were there no distinction between pleas where the defendant knows he didn’t 
commit the crime and pleas where he does, Justice Scalia would have been 
right.  But there is a distinction, and the factual-basis cases have survived 
Bousley.103  Scalia’s prediction did not come true—at least it hasn’t yet.  
Bousley notwithstanding, you can still plead guilty to crimes that you didn’t 
commit.104  
                                                
99  137 P.3d 835 (Wash. 2006). 
100 Id.  
101  People v. Jackson, 694 P.2d. 736, 839 (Cal. 1985) (en banc), overruled on 
other grounds by People v. Guerrero, 748 P.2d. 1150 (Cal. 1988).  
102  Bousley v. United States, 532 U.S. 614, 634–35 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). Justice Scalia having been no fan of plea bargaining, see Lafler v. 
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391 (Scalia, J., dissenting), one wonders why he 
considered his observation that the Court might be invalidating pleas to crimes that 
were not committed to be a bad thing.  But see id.   
103  See LAFAVE ET. AL., supra note 96 (LaFave’s treatise continues to quote all 
these cases as good law and two of them were decided after Bousley).  
104  One might be tempted to point to North Carolina v. Alford’s statement that a 
guilty plea may be entered against a defendant who continues to claim he is innocent 
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Finally, we have examples of courts upholding guilty pleas to crimes that 
could not be proven only where other crimes likely could be proven—or, at 
least, where the prosecution and the court do not know anything about the 
underlying conduct motivating the charges.105  Presumably, courts would not 
uphold a plea of guilty to a (serious106) crime that everyone knows is 
completely fabricated out of thin air.  Maybe this is because such a plea 
reveals that something fishy is taking place, like “promises that are by their 
nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business 
(e.g. bribes).”107  I’ll come back to this in Part II.  But for now, I’d like to 
note two facets of this distinction.  First, I’d like to situate it on the axis of 
materiality.  Defendants are less likely to plead guilty if they know that they 
can’t be convicted of anything than if they know they can’t be convicted of 
the crime charged but can be convicted of something else.  Thus, to fall 
within the disclosure obligation that already exists as a matter of 
constitutional doctrine, information must be highly material to the guilty plea 
decision.   
 Second, I’d like to turn back to Bousley’s requirement that the defendant 
be actually innocent of other crimes down from which he could have 
bargained to his conviction.108  This requirement supports my argument 
because it limits the defendant’s ability to attack his conviction to the case in 
which he did not know—and could not have known—that he could not be 
convicted of the crime with which he was charged.  In the case where a 
defendant bargains down from a crime of which he could be convicted to a 
crime of which he could not be convicted—like Zhao109—he almost certainly 
knows that, as a matter of law, he cannot be convicted of the second crime.  
He is making a deal where everyone knows the facts.    
                                                                                                               
so long as there exists another “factual basis” for the plea.  N. Carolina v. Alford, 
400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). But Alford requires the factual basis only where the 
defendant refuses to allocute to the elements of the offense and to admit his guilt.  
Alford’s requirement is a safeguard against guilty pleas that are based on improper 
inducements or the like.  
105  See, e.g., State v. Zhao, 137 P.3d 835, 836 (Wash. 2006). 
106  There are abundant examples of courts upholding utterly preposterous guilty 
pleas to low-level misdemeanors for the purpose of churning defendants through the 
system as expeditiously as possible.  Cf., e.g., Josh Bowers, Grassroots Plea 
Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 85 (2007).  J.J. Prescott and I have written elsewhere 
that, because of the dominance of process costs, statutory law in fact has no role 
whatsoever in the prosecution of very low-level crimes.  Charlie Gerstein & J.J. 
Prescott, Process Costs and Police Discretion, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 268, 273 
(2015).     
107  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). 
108  Bousley v. United States, 532 U.S. 614, 624 (1998).  
109  137 P.3d 835. 
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D. A Doctrinal Explanation of the Dormant Disclosure Obligation 
 
Bousley says that you can overturn a guilty plea if the court later finds 
out that you were innocent.110  But the cases above say that you cannot 
overturn a guilty plea that was made as part of a deal in which everyone 
knew the charges couldn’t be proven.111  The difference is disclosure.  In 
Bousley, no one knew that the charges couldn’t be proven.  But in the factual 
basis cases cited above, everyone knew that the charges couldn’t be 
proven—indeed, sometimes, the charges aren’t crimes at all.112 
The obligation to disclose, though, is enforced post-hoc only, and is a 
necessary,113 but not a sufficient, condition to a successful guilty plea.  If a 
defendant asked a court to compel disclosure of exculpatory information 
during plea bargaining, I do not argue that most courts would oblige the 
defendant.  In Bousley, after all, even the government did not know that 
Bousley could not be convicted.  Thus, more precisely stated, the cases in 
Sections B and C stand for the proposition that the defendant must know that 
he cannot be convicted, not that the prosecution must tell him.  This won’t 
matter for my purposes.  If the prosecution knows of evidence establishing 
actual innocence and does not want the defendant to be able to vacate the 
plea later, the prosecution must give him the information.  The mere fact that 
the plea might be vulnerable even if they do not know of the information 
does not, to my mind, change this result.  
Perhaps, though, the distinction between the cases in Section B and the 
cases in Section C hinges not on disclosure—or even on the defendant’s 
knowledge—but on the distinction between “factual” innocence and “legal” 
innocence (however slippery that distinction may be).  On this account, 
Bousley protects only those defendants who really did not do anything and 
the cases in Section B are just about protecting guilty pleas from pesky post-
hoc attacks.  
Two points suffice to rebut this contention.  First, consider the other 
informational requirements attendant to a guilty plea.  For a guilty plea to be 
valid, a defendant must be advised of each of the “critical” elements of the 
                                                
110  Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623. 
111  See, e.g., Zhao, 137 P.3d at 836. 
112  See People v. Martinez, 611 N.E.2d 277, 277 (N.Y. 1993) (“While we will 
allow a defendant to plead to a nonexistent crime in satisfaction of an indictment 
charging a crime with a heavier penalty ([People v. Foster, 225 N.E.2d 200, 200 
(N.Y. 1967)]), and we will allow a conviction based on a lesser crime charged by the 
court that was in fact not a lesser included offense but nonetheless a valid crime 
([People v. Ford, 465 N.E.2d 322, 322 (N.Y. 1984)]), these situations differ 
significantly from a jury conviction of a crime not recognized by law.” (emphasis 
added)).  
113  Assuming, of course, that the prosecutor has information to disclose.  
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crime to which he is pleading guilty.114  Even where “the prosecutor ha[s] 
overwhelming evidence of guilt,” she must formally charge the defendant 
with, and someone115 must thoroughly explain the requirements of, the crime 
to which the defendant is pleading guilty.  The Court is not, as a general 
proposition, averse to hypertechnical attacks on guilty pleas and, in fact, 
requires a rather precise set of disclosures even where they likely have no 
effect on the decision to plead guilty and have nothing whatever to do with 
the defendant’s factual innocence.116  
Second, note that the Court has never explicitly recognized a 
freestanding constitutional innocence claim.  The mere fact that a person 
later discovered to be innocent was convicted is not, in itself, necessarily a 
violation of the Constitution.117  It is certainly possible, as scholars have 
contended, that the Court would recognize a freestanding innocence claim if 
the question were squarely presented and the facts reasonably compelling.118  
But, as it stands, the Court has yet to formally recognize such a claim and, 
thus, Bousley is not part of an overarching jurisprudence in which innocence 
is key to constitutional relief, even if the doctrine eventually goes in that 
direction.  Bousley, then, creates, at least in part, a regime requiring 
disclosure in certain circumstances.   
                                                
114  Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 n.18 (1976).  
115  Defense counsel can do this.  See Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 
(2005).  
116  See Henderson, 426 U.S. at 644–45 (“Instead of testing the voluntariness of a 
plea by determining whether a ritualistic litany of the formal legal elements of an 
offense was read to the defendant, petitioner argues that the court should examine the 
totality of the circumstances and determine whether the substance of the charge, as 
opposed to its technical elements, was conveyed to the accused.  We do not disagree 
with the thrust of petitioner’s argument, but we are persuaded that even under the test 
which he espouses, this judgment finding respondent guilty of second-degree murder 
was defective.  We assume, as petitioner argues, that the prosecutor had 
overwhelming evidence of guilt available.  We also accept petitioner’s 
characterization of the competence of respondent’s counsel and of the wisdom of 
their advice to plead guilty to a charge of second-degree murder.  Nevertheless, such 
a plea cannot support a judgment of guilt unless it was voluntary in a constitutional 
sense.  And clearly the plea could not be voluntary in the sense that it constituted an 
intelligent admission that he committed the offense unless the defendant received 
‘real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally 
recognized requirement of due process.’” (quoting Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 
334 (1941) (footnote omitted)).   
117  See Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1631 
(2008) (“Most prominently, in 1993, in Herrera v. Collins, the Court narrowly failed 
to recognize a constitutional innocence claim in the context of capital cases, 
emphasizing the dual concerns of finality and reliability.” (citing Herrera v. Collins, 
506 U.S. 390, 401, 403–04 (1993))).  
118  E.g., Robert J. Smith, Recalibrating Constitutional Innocence Protection, 87 
WASH. L. REV. 139, 174 (2012). 
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Occasionally, hints of this come out in courts’ language.  Consider Judge 
Easterbrook, explaining why courts often take a factual basis colloquy on the 
record, even though they don’t have to: “Putting the basis on the record not 
only helps the defendant make a wise choice but also prevents subsequent 
litigation in which the defendant denies knowing some vital bit of 
information.”119  Why would he need to know the factual basis of the plea?  
Because later on, Judge Easterbrook must assume, he could attack the 
validity of his plea by claiming that he did not know everything he was 
supposed to in order to plead guilty.  Namely, by claiming that he didn’t 
know he could not be convicted. 
Prosecutors, then, must disclose certain exculpatory information to the 
defense attendant to a plea of guilty: that which establishes the defendant’s 
actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.  This is a very high 
bar—considerably north of Brady’s materiality standard.  But there is some 
disclosure obligation on prosecutors attendant to a guilty plea.  Courts and 
commentators have been focusing on whether there is such an obligation,120 
but those arguments overlook the important existing doctrine described 
above.  That doctrine proves that there is a disclosure obligation, and we 
know from Ruiz that it doesn’t cover impeachment information.  The 
interesting questions, then, concern the scope of the obligation: Can the 
defendant trade it for a lower sentence?  What’s impeachment? And, what is 
the materiality standard?  The next three Parts will consider these questions 
in turn.  
  
II.  WAIVING DISCLOSURE 
 
Defendants can, in general, exchange their criminal-procedure rights for 
a lower sentence.  The problem here is a species of unconstitutional 
conditions:121 the government can outright deny you a plea bargain; it can 
offer you a lower sentence ex gracia; and it can condition a lower sentence 
on, say, your waiver of the rights to trial, confrontation, and freedom from 
self-incrimination; but can it condition that lower sentence on your 
agreement to waive your right to exculpatory information? 
                                                
119  Higgason v. Clark, 984 F.2d 203, 207–08 (7th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added). 
120  See supra notes 18–23. 
121  There is a mountain of literature on the subject.  For my personal favorite, see 
Mitchell Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three 
Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 2 n.1 (2001) (citing Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Unconstitutional, Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1421 (1989); Lynn A. Baker, 
Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1921, n.36 
(1995) (citing many others); David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: 
Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
675, 679–80 (1992); Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional 
Rights as Public Goods, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 859, 859, 860 (1995)). 
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Only one commentator, Daniel Blank, has addressed this question.122  
Writing before Ruiz, Blank aimed to resolve a standoff that had developed in 
the Northern District of California, where he was an assistant Federal Public 
Defender at the time.123  In 1995, the Ninth Circuit held that Brady applies to 
a guilty plea.124  In response, the United States Attorney’s Office for the 
Northern District started to request Brady waivers in all of their plea 
bargains.125  The defenders refused to advise their clients to sign these 
waivers.126  An impasse resulted.127 
Blank sought to clarify the doctrine of criminal-procedure waiver128 not 
through resort to first principles of a coherent, unifying theory, but rather 
through “the eclectic, communicative approach . . . suggested by the 
emerging school of legal thought known as Legal Pragmatism, which 
proposes that legal theory begin with existing practice and then consider the 
range of potential jurisprudential approaches, treating the theories as 
perspectives, each of which can add to the understanding of law.”129  He then 
brought a diverse set of legal doctrines to the problem, and, ultimately, 
concluded that “contract” principles invalidate these waivers, but that the 
doctrine of “unconstitutional conditions” cannot effectively distinguish 
between these waivers and other constitutionally kosher ones.130  This, Blank 
thinks, is because the Court, “on a crass accounting of judicial economy, 
[concluded] that plea bargaining and its attendant waivers are immune to a 
claim of unconstitutional conditions.”131  Instead, contract law is the answer.  
“The contract principles of adhesion, duress, mistake, unconscionability, and 
public policy all suggest,” Blank writes, “that, even if the practice of plea 
bargaining as a whole can pass constitutional muster under contract analysis, 
waivers of the right to disclosure of Brady material cannot.”132 
I take the opposite approach.  The problem with using contract law to 
invalidate Brady waivers is that waiver doctrine in criminal procedure 
obviously tolerates agreements that contract law would not.  Consider first 
                                                
122  Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: a Legal Pragmatist’s 
Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011 (2006). 
123  Id. at 2011 n.a1.  
124  See Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1995).  
125  Blank, supra note 122, at 2014 n.13. 
126  Id. at 2014.  
127  Id. 
128  Importantly, he distinguishes between waiver (the intentional relinquishment 
of a right), forfeiture (the relinquishment of a right by operation of law), and 
alienation (trading the right for a lower sentence).  See generally id.  In this paper, I 
use the term “waiver” chiefly to mean “alienation,” but where the distinction is 
relevant, I will make it clear which I mean.   
129 Id. at 2014–15 (internal quotations omitted) (internal citations omitted).  
130  Id. at 2066–67.  
131  Id. 
132  Id. at 2074.  
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the waiver of Fifth Amendment rights.  Waivers are valid when made in 
response to outright fraud,133 and where no rational actor would reasonably 
make them (read: where they are unconscionable); 134  waivers become 
presumptively impermissible only after 36 continuous hours of custodial 
interrogation;135 and, it is hard to imagine the doctrine of public policy 
coming to the rescue of Miranda.136  
Blank might respond that I am impermissibly trying to unify Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment waiver doctrines, thus butting up against his 
methodological premise of eclecticism.  Fair enough.  Let’s look specifically 
at plea bargains.  Defendants can, and often do, plead guilty merely to get out 
of jail because they would spend more time there waiting for trial than they 
will be sentenced to if they plead guilty.137  No contract doctrine can save a 
heads-I-win-tails-you-lose deal like this.  Prosecutors can condition your plea 
bargain on your agreement to waive the assistance of counsel.138  This is a 
bar-exam-worthy example of procedural unconscionability.139  A prosecutor 
can charge you with a crime punishable by life in prison to convince you to 
plead guilty to floating an $88.30 check140—meaning, she can make you plea 
bargain under duress.  And, given that the Eighth Amendment imposes only 
the barest of restrictions on non-capital sentences for adults,141 a prosecutor 
can pretty much turn the screws as hard as she wants to get you to plead 
guilty to something.  
To get you to plead guilty, a prosecutor can threaten to have you 
killed.142  This is not compatible with contract law. 
Instead, I go back to what Blank calls the “unconstitutional conditions” 
approach.  Blank claims that “under the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions, the prosecution should not be able to seek a plea bargain waiver 
of the defendant’s right to disclosure of material favorable evidence.  
However, starting with the Brady [v. United States] Trilogy, the Court has 
                                                
133  E.g., Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 607 (3d Cir. 1986). 
134  See William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REV. 
761, 842 (1989). 
135 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944).  
136  William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 976 (2001). 
137  E.g., Charlie Gerstein, Note, Plea Bargaining and the Right to Counsel at Bail 
Hearings, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1513, 1514 (2013).  
138  E.g., State v. Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d 576, 586 (Tex. 2013) (finding not “a 
single case in which the defendant’s plea was constitutionally involuntary because 
the State offered him an especially favorable plea bargain if he waived his right to 
counsel . . . .”). 
139  E.g., State ex rel. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Webster, 752 S.E.2d 372, 
389 (W. Va. 2013). 
140  Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 359 (1978). 
141  Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003).  
142  See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218 (1978); Brady v. United States, 
397 U.S. 742, 745 (1970). 
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resolutely reaffirmed, apparently on a crass accounting of judicial economy, 
that plea bargaining and its attendant waivers are immune to a claim of 
unconstitutional conditions.” 143   I disagree. 144   Instead, I think we can 
differentiate, in an important way, the Brady (v. Maryland) waiver from the 
ordinary crass and coercive plea bargain.  My point is this: the government 
can act with the purpose of getting you to plead guilty, but cannot act with 
the purpose of getting you to plead guilty when it knows you are not guilty. 
In fairness, I have the benefit of writing this article after Ruiz.  Why, you 
might ask, is this a benefit?  I will argue, in the Sections that follow, that the 
approach I just suggested helps explain why Ruiz distinguishes between 
impeachment and non-impeachment exculpatory information.  Most of the 
time, the prosecution can point to good reasons to withhold impeachment 
information.  It cannot, in general, point to similar reasons to withhold all 
exculpatory information.  
This Part is organized as follows.  First, I briefly discuss why I think this 
is such an important question.  To do this, I set up a model of plea 
bargaining.  It shows that only an unwaiveable Brady right will increase the 
accuracy of guilty pleas—with accuracy measured by how closely a 
bargained-for outcome approaches the likely outcome at trial—and that a 
waiveable one will not.  Those readers familiar with the economic literature 
on plea bargaining can safely skip this Section (although Section II.D. may 
prompt the skippers to come back and take a look).  Next, I set up a solution 
to the waiver problem that seems like it might work, but ultimately doesn’t: 
the concept of bootstrapping.  The bootstrapping argument holds that you 
cannot waive those rights whose purpose is to protect the accuracy and 
validity of their own waiver.  I discuss this argument to point to reasons why 
it doesn’t work, but also point to an argument that does, or might.  Finally, I 
discuss what I think is a solution to the problem of waiving Brady rights in a 
plea bargain: unconstitutional conditions.  I do not, however, want to wade 
too deeply into the abyss of unconstitutional-conditions doctrine and 
scholarship, so I will aim in this part to show you that under most, if not all, 
prevailing conceptions of unconstitutional conditions doctrine, these waivers 
aren’t kosher, even though the rest of plea bargaining is.  The key, on all 
accounts, is governmental purpose.  
 
                                                
143  Blank, supra note 122, at 2067.  
144  Others are troubled by the doctrinal separation between plea bargaining and 
unconstitutional conditions.  See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. 
U. L. REV. 801, 801 (2003).   
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A. Consequences of the Rule: Modeling the Plea Bargain 
 
Allow me to set up, briefly, a model145 of plea bargaining in order to 
show you why this particular question—can you or can you not waive the 
right to view material exculpatory information when you plead guilty?—is so 
important.  
Begin with the premise that we’re in the Fifth Circuit and that the 
disclosure obligation is at its minimum—meaning, the materiality standard is 
as high as possible given Bousley. 
Assume, for now, that an individual prosecutor selects a sentence in 
each case that she believes to be just and, therefore, seeks to strike a bargain 
that gets as close to that sentence as possible, with a discount for avoiding the 
risk and hassle of a trial.  Although there is a vigorous debate about what 
prosecutors are generally trying to do—or, in the argot, “maximize”—when 
offering plea bargains, and, of course, motives vary from prosecutor to 
prosecutor and case to case, I assume here the prosecutor has a utility 
function with a satiation point,146 in the argot again.  This means that she 
seeks a sentence that is as close as possible to the sentence that she believes 
to be just.  This assumption is warranted because (1) in some cases it may be 
true, and (2) other reasonable utility functions that the prosecutor might have 
will only make the following argument stronger.  (I briefly relax this 
assumption below to prove point (2).)   
Also assume that, because of the evidence in the case, the prosecutor 
has an extensive, but not unlimited, menu of criminal statutes with which she 
can charge the defendant.  She picks the charge from the menu such that the 
bargained-for solution will likely reach her target point.  She bargains by 
offering to drop charges if the defendant agrees to plead guilty to a charge 
with the target sentence or add them if he doesn’t.  The weaker the evidence 
she has, the greater the charge she must choose so that a (presumably 
rational, risk-averse) defendant will settle on the targeted sentence.  Her 
evidence might be too weak, and the range of plausible charges insufficiently 
draconian, to achieve the targeted sentence.  In this case, she must either 
settle for what she can get or tough it out and go to trial.  
Finally, assume that there is an information asymmetry in plea 
bargaining that runs in favor of the prosecutor, because, as a very general 
matter, she almost always knows more about the evidence she can put on 
                                                
145  This model is limited to relatively serious cases.  In low-level misdemeanors, 
factors like pretrial detention dominate the criminal process and prosecutors’ motives 
are notably different from what I am about to describe.  See Charlie Gerstein & J.J. 
Prescott, supra note 106; Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass 
Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 615 (2014); Josh Bowers, Punishing the 
Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1132 (2008).   
146  For my purposes, this can be a range—rather than a point—without loss of 
generality.  
28       UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 15, No. 1 
 
 
than the defendant does.147  Many economic models of plea bargaining make 
the opposite assumption.148  But, generally speaking, even though defendants 
almost certainly know more about what actually happened, within the 
epistemological sphere of the courtroom, the prosecution knows what will be 
presented to the jury.  Thus, for my purposes, I can assume that the 
prosecution has superior information with which to bargain, even if the 
defendant knows that he is, in truth, guilty of the charged offense.149 
If the defendant has no right to exculpatory information, the prosecutor 
can bluff.150  By definition, the defendant does not know the exculpatory 
information he is bargaining away along with his right to trial.  Maybe the 
prosecutor knows about it, and maybe she doesn’t.  But for my purposes, this 
won’t matter, because either way the defendant seeks to minimize his 
sentence by bargaining with the prosecutor while uncertain of her 
knowledge.  And, it is this uncertainty that allows the prosecutor to bluff.   
Bluffing, on this model, reduces the accuracy of guilty pleas, where 
accuracy is measured by how closely the plea-bargaining process mirrors the 
likely outcome at trial, adjusted for the convenience of avoiding the trial and 
its attendant uncertainties.  By hiding from the defendant what she will 
present at trial, the prosecutor can use the defendant’s aversion to the risk of 
trial to get him to plead guilty.  But defenders of the bluff may say that it can 
separate the guilty from the innocent: where a prosecutor doesn’t know much 
about the facts of the underlying incident, but the defendant does, the 
innocent will call the bluff but the guilty won’t.  Anyone who watches Law 
& Order knows this argument.  It’s wrong for two reasons.  First, the 
prosecutor’s enormous advantage in bargaining power ensures that plenty of 
innocent defendants won’t be able to call the bluff.151  Second, this would-be 
                                                
147  This assumption is not quite generally true.  In alibi cases, for example, the 
defendant might know that his defense is much stronger than the prosecutor thinks it 
is.  But, barring unusual circumstances or defendants, a defendant with a strong 
defense almost always benefits by telling the prosecution about it and thereby 
avoiding the nightmare of a criminal prosecution if he can.  Thus, it isn’t terribly 
important that we consider this subset of cases and I will, as such, ignore them from 
here on out.   
148  Compare Barrett Lain, supra note 21 (information asymmetry in favor of 
prosecutor), with Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1969, 1972 (1992) (information asymmetry runs in favor of the defendant), and 
Bibas, supra note 10, 1118 (2011) (same).  
149  See supra note 25.   
150  Douglass, Can Prosecutors Bluff?, supra note 23. 
151  Samuel Gross has two excellent articles on the subject of innocent people 
pleading guilty.  Samuel R. Gross, Pretrial Incentives, Post-Conviction Review, and 
Sorting Criminal Prosecutions by Guilt or Innocence, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1009, 
1014 n.15 (2011) (discussing “innocent defendants who plead guilty to avoid the 
process costs of a criminal prosecution, in particular those who have been held long 
enough in pretrial detention that they will get to go home if they accept the 
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bluffing-apologist is using accuracy in a manner different from the way I am.  
I’m talking about accuracy only in relation to trial.  
To summarize, this is the model I work with in this Section: (1) 
prosecutors seek to hit a target sentence and have a wide range of charging 
options, and (2) defendants are rational, risk-averse sentence-minimizers who 
do not, before the bargaining begins, know much about the prosecution’s 
case. 
Now, imagine that we change criminal procedure doctrine to recognize 
a Brady obligation attendant to a guilty plea, but that a defendant can waive it 
in exchange for a lower sentence.  In cases where the prosecutor’s target 
sentence is moderate or low, the potential range of charges severe, and the 
evidence reasonably strong, the prosecutor need only up the charges a little 
bit in exchange for trading away the Brady right—she’ll end up at the same 
targeted sentence.  In these cases, recognizing the Brady right but allowing it 
to be waived will ratchet up the charges.  But everyone will end up in the 
same place.  
In other cases, where the evidence is weak, and the range of possible 
charges limited, the prosecutor will have already hit the top charge on the 
menu in order to reach (or try to reach) her target sentence.  In these cases, 
the new right will give the defendant something of value to trade and will, 
generally, lower his bargained-for sentence.  By how much is anybody’s 
guess.  But whatever the discount is, it will be totally unrelated to the content 
of the Brady material, because, by definition, the prosecutor is bargaining for 
the right to conceal that material.  This is crucial.  The Brady rule will not 
enhance accuracy because, even though some defendants will get lower 
sentences, those sentences won’t be lower because of the Brady evidence, 
and, therefore, won’t be lower because the defendant has a lower chance of 
being convicted at trial.  Even if we relax the assumption that prosecutors 
seek to hit a targeted sentence and assume, instead, that they simply want to 
maximize the defendant’s sentence in all cases,152 the prosecutor will have hit 
the top charge on the menu in every case anyway.  If prosecutors seek only to 
maximize sentences, the Brady right will lower defendants’ sentences across 
the board, but will have no relationship to accuracy.  
But what if you can’t bargain Brady away?  Now, the prosecutor must 
turn over all material, exculpatory information to the defendant.  The 
prosecutor will be strongly discouraged from bringing those charges for 
                                                                                                               
prosecutor’s offer to plead guilty in return for a sentence of imprisonment that they 
have already served.”); Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 173, 180 (2008).  But see Wilkinson, supra note 95.  
152  This was supposed to be how U.S. Attorneys made charging decisions under 
John Ashcroft.  See United States v. Purcell, 667 F. Supp. 2d 498, 506 (E.D. Pa. 
2009), as amended (Oct. 30, 2009) (“[Ashcroft’s] memorandum directs federal 
prosecutors to charge the most serious, readily provable offense supported by the 
facts of the case.”).   
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which she knows she has a bunch of Brady evidence—meaning, those where 
the defendant is less likely to be convicted at trial.  And, most importantly, 
the information asymmetry between prosecution and defense will be reduced, 
and the prosecutor will no longer be able to bluff.  For the prosecutor who 
already sets her target sentence after some investigation, and sets it so that 
the state of the evidence and range of plausible charges allows her to reach 
her target sentence, this rule will not change that sentence.  But for the 
prosecutor who doesn’t investigate much in advance, or who does rely on 
bluffing to achieve her targeted sentence, this rule will serve to enhance the 
accuracy of guilty pleas.  Now, she will have to investigate to assure the 
security of the plea, and she will no longer be able to bluff.  
Academics debate the capacity of Brady to enhance the accuracy of 
guilty pleas.  Professors Barrett Lain and McMunigal argue that Brady for 
plea bargains will serve to enhance accuracy and reduce information 
asymmetries, 153  while Professor Douglas counters that it won’t. 154   But 
neither camp addresses the waiver question that, on the model above, as well 
as on Barrett Lain’s own model,155 is the crucial question if accuracy is our 
concern.  And, Douglass claims that premising a Brady obligation on 
whether or not it enhances accuracy proves too much: Brady, he notes, 
covers only exculpatory information, so prosecutors can still hide as much 
inculpatory information as they want. 156   Barrett Lain responds to this 
objection by noting that defense counsel are repeat players and will sanction 
prosecutors with worse deals in the future if they withhold inculpatory 
evidence.157  Both of them assume that the mere fact that Brady does not do 
everything possible to remedy inaccuracy means that it does not remedy 
inaccuracy.  This is obviously wrong.  The existing scholarship, by focusing 
on whether or not Brady applies to a guilty plea, and whether applying it to a 
guilty plea will enhance accuracy, overlooks the important question whether 
a defendant can waive the right to Brady information.  
On my model, to summarize, an unwaiveable Brady right will enhance 
accuracy, but a waiveable one won’t.  By eliminating bluffing and reducing 
information asymmetries, a Brady rule will, generally, enhance accuracy, but 
only if you can’t bargain it away.  If you can, prosecutors will simply 
respond by upping the charges or offering you a better deal, the additional 
leniency of which is unrelated to the strength of the case against you.  
Whether you can waive the right is the crucial question.  The following 
Sections aim to address it.   
                                                
153  Barret Lain, supra note 21; McMunigal, Wrongful Convictions, supra note 
21.  
154  Douglass, Can Prosecutors Bluff?, supra note 23, at 588; Douglass, Fatal 
Attraction?, supra note 23, at 468. 
155  See supra note 152. 
156  Douglass, Fatal Attraction?, supra note 23, at 468.   
157  Barrett Lain, supra note 21, at 34–35.  




B. A Solution that Doesn’t Work: Bootstrapping 
 
Before moving on to a solution that does work—or might work—I’d like 
to consider, briefly, one that doesn’t: an anti-bootstrapping rule.  This 
argument holds that constitutional doctrine forbids waiving rights whose 
purpose is to protect the validity of the waiver of those same rights. 
The bootstrapping argument has prevailed in appellate cases concerning 
the validity of waivers of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on appeal 
and collateral attack.  When defendants specifically waive their rights to raise 
ineffective assistance of counsel, courts have consistently held that those 
waivers do not cover claims that the attorney was ineffective in advising the 
defendant to accept the plea deal itself. 158   “[A]n impermissible boot-
strapping arises,” the Fifth Circuit writes, “where a waiver is sought to be 
enforced to bar a claim that the waiver itself—or the plea agreement of which 
it was a part—was unknowing or involuntary.”159 
This argument makes good sense, and it would solve our waiver problem 
easily—but it doesn’t fit the rest of criminal-procedure doctrine well at all.  
Where the waiver of a right defeats its purpose in existing, you might think, 
you can’t waive it.  After all, although I have been writing as though you 
could separate the “right” from the “waiver” neatly, of course you can’t.  The 
ability to waive the right defines as much of its substantive scope as the class 
of defendants it covers or the strength of protection it affords when it does.160  
And, it would be a bizarre right that defeats itself.  So, it would be absurd to 
allow that a right might be waived when the waiver would defeat the right.  
And yet, if you think this is absurd, absurdity is what the doctrine gives 
us.  Defendants can waive plenty of rights whose purpose is, at least in part, 
                                                
158  See United States v. White, 307 F.3d. 336 (5th Cir. 2002); Mason v. United 
States, 211 F.3d 1065 (7th Cir. 2000) (waiver of ineffective assistance claim is 
enforceable against a claim that the attorney was defective in sentencing because that 
claim to does not touch the validity of the plea); Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 
1142 (7th Cir. 1998) (waiver not enforceable because the claimed ineffective 
assistance concerned negotiating the agreement itself); United States v. Djelevic, 161 
F.3d 104 (2nd Cir. 1998) (waiver enforceable because claim of ineffective assistance 
does not implicate the voluntary character of the plea); United States v. Pruitt, 32 
F.3d. 431 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Jones v. United States, 2014 WL 1328394 (11th 
Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (overturning district court’s dismissal of a 
collateral attack on waiver grounds because the petitioner was “raising his claims 
based on his guilty pleas” and “specifically challenged the voluntariness of the 
pleas.”); Nancy J. King, Plea Bargains That Waive Claims of Ineffective Assistance - 
Waiving Padilla and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 647, 654–55 (2013). 
159  White, 307 F.3d. at 343.  
160  See William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REV. 
761, 831 (1989) (citing Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of 
Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1214, 1218 (1977)) 
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to protect the validity of the waiver.  In the remainder of this Section, I’ll go 
through some of these waivers, with an eye to what they tell us about the 
solution that might work.  I have three principal examples of this 
phenomenon.  Defendants can waive the right to counsel as part of a plea 
bargain—meaning, the prosecution can insist on a defendant waiving the 
assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty as part of a deal in 
which he pleads guilty.  Defendants can waive their rights to view 
information about confidential informants.  And, defendants can waive their 
rights to appeal their convictions.  
You might be surprised to learn that you can waive your right to counsel 
as part of a plea bargain.  Indeed, Professor Gertner, then a prominent federal 
judge, and now a prominent professor, thought one cannot. 161   But, 
constitutionally, you can waive your right to counsel when you plead 
guilty,162 even though the purpose of having counsel when you plead guilty is 
to assure that your waiver of your right to trial is knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary. 163   Thus, bootstrapping is not strictly forbidden in criminal 
procedure. 
Similarly, you can waive the right to the effective assistance of your 
counsel, which right would seem chiefly important in protecting its own 
waiver.  That’s not all.  As Professor King noted in a recent article, 
 
These ineffectiveness waivers block claims regarding 
incompetence occurring after the plea, such as bad advice 
during sentencing. They also bar claims based on pre-plea 
ineptitude, including trial error that leads to the plea, 
inadequate or erroneous advice about sentencing 
consequences, failing to suppress evidence, and failing to 
investigate or assert claims or defenses such as double 
jeopardy, or competency. A waiver has even been held to 
bar a defendant’s claim that his lawyer should have advised 
him of the possibility of pleading guilty without the 
waiver.164 
 
                                                
161  Nancy Gertner, The Right to Appeal is an Issue of Fairness, N.Y. TIMES 
ROOM FOR DEBATE, July 15, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/08/19/do-prosecutors-have-too-much-
power/having-the-right-to-appeal-is-an-issue-of-fairness [https://perma.cc/XH29-
B4EL] (“You can’t bargain away your right to counsel in a guilty plea deal . . . .”).  
162  State v. Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (finding not “a 
single case in which the defendant’s plea was constitutionally involuntary because 
the State offered him an especially favorable plea bargain if he waived his right to 
counsel . . . .”). 
163  E.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).  
164  King, supra note 158, at 654–55 (internal citations omitted).   
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The final example is the most compelling, but the case establishing it 
was vacated after the article citing it was published.165 At least where the 
district court has enforced a bargain in which the defendant actually waives 
his right to complain that he was given deficient advice in choosing to 
bargain away his right to get that specific advice, the defendant can get 
relief.166  Other than that, though, courts routinely enforce waivers of the 
right to counsel when the defendant pleads guilty.167  
At trial, defendants have the right to cross-examine confidential 
informants.  Pleading guilty waives the right to a trial and, thus, to cross-
examine anyone.  Similarly, plea bargains that require a defendant to forego 
his right to learn the identity of the witnesses against him are routinely 
enforced.168  Defendants who plead guilty without learning the identities of 
those who provide the evidence against them waive a right whose purpose is 
to protect the accuracy of their waiver.  If they knew that the informant 
against them was a known liar, they would not plead guilty.  Nonetheless, 
courts enforce bargains requiring such waivers routinely. 
Finally, every circuit court that has addressed the issue in the federal 
system has concluded that a defendant can waive his right to appeal,169 whose 
purpose is to protect the constitutional sanctity of the guilty plea and the 
propriety of the resulting sentence.  
To my mind—although I am less certain about this conclusion than about 
several others offered in this paper—these cases gesture towards a solution 
that might work.  Take the confidential informant cases.  In those cases, 
courts point to perfectly legitimate reasons why the prosecution might need 
to conceal the information, which reasons are totally unrelated to convincing 
the defendant to plead guilty.170  Namely, the confidential informants may be 
involved in ongoing investigations that would be compromised, or the 
prosecutors might generally be worried about their safety.  Similarly, 
waiving counsel when pleading guilty speeds up the criminal process—
particularly in states where appointing counsel can take a while.171  While 
this has the effect of reducing the accuracy of the plea-bargaining process, 
the circumstances in which these waivers are likely to occur do not evince a 
                                                
165  Jones v. United States, No. 8:12-cv-914-T-30TGW, 2013 WL 24226 (M.D. 
Fla. 2013), rev’d, 559 F. App’x 976, 977 (11th Cir. Apr. 4, 2014) (per curiam).    
166  Id. at *3. 
167  Id.    
168  For good examples, see Porter v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.3d 382, 391 (Ky. 
2011) (waiver of Brady right to view information about a C.I. is okay because it is 
motivated by a desire to protect the informant, not a desire to railroad the defendant); 
State v. Moen, 76 P.3d 721 (Wash. 2003) (en banc); People v. Moore, 804 N.E.2d 
595 (Ill. App. 2003).  
169  LAFAVE ET. AL., supra note 96, § 27.5(c) n.57.  
170  See supra note 168.   
171  Compare State v. Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013), with 
Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., Tex., 554 U.S. 191, 196 (2008). 
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prosecutorial purpose to reduce accuracy.  Query whether a court would 
sanction a plea bargain to murder that required the defendant to waive his 
right to counsel.  And so I think this distinction—between circumstances in 
which an impermissible purpose is likely and circumstances in which it is 
not—is very important, both to the solution I offer below and generally.  
 
C. A Solution that Might Work: Prosecutorial Purpose 
 
Unconstitutional conditions doctrine is a mess172—one into which I do 
not want to wade too deeply.  That’s because the concept has been 
thoroughly covered by legal scholars 173  and I have precious little to 
contribute.  Rather, I’d like to discuss unconstitutional conditions only 
briefly, and only for the limited purpose of elucidating something about 
criminal procedure that might not be obvious at first glance. 
My point about unconstitutional conditions scholarship is this: when you 
ask people who think about this problem what makes unconstitutional 
conditions unconstitutional, they will tell you some combination of the 
following two things.  Either they’ll tell you that the bargain is 
unconstitutional because it results in the impermissible effect of allowing the 
government to get you to give up a constitutional right, or they’ll tell you the 
bargain is unconstitutional because it is made with the purpose of getting you 
to give up a constitutional right. 
I think the second position is basically right, with a few important 
qualifications.174  But that is not the point of this article.  Rather, the point is 
to leave you with the impression that—whatever your view on 
unconstitutional conditions175—Brady waivers are unconstitutional but your 
garden-variety plea bargain is not. 
So the solution is obvious.  Brady waivers are unconstitutional because 
they effect an unconstitutional result—convicting the innocent—and because 
                                                
172  E.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid 
Expansion: A Study in the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
1283, 1348 n.142 (2013) (“You could read a dozen scholarly discussions of ‘the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine’ before running into a clear statement of what 
the doctrine is supposed to say or what its content is.”  (citing William W. Van 
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right–Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 
HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1445–46 (1968)); Philip Hamburger, Unconstitutional 
Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 VA. L. REV. 479, 480 (2012) 
(“unconstitutional conditions therefore are considered a sort of Gordian knot”).  
173  I will resist the temptation to plug in citations to the mountainous literature on 
unconstitutional conditions.  Take my word for it that the literature is mountainous.  
174  This accords with a broader view of legal rights.  Cf. Don Herzog, The Kerr 
Principle, State Action, and Legal Rights, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1, 45 (2006). 
175  Unless you believe that no bargain is unconstitutional.  E.g., Richard A. 
Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (1988).  If you believe that, I’m out of luck.  
2016  PLEA BARGAINING AND PROSECUTORIAL MOTIVES 35 
 
 
they evince the same impermissible purpose.  Now I have to show you why 
Brady waivers are different from ordinary criminal-procedure waivers, which 
are constitutional.  The next Section aims to do that. 
But first, a brief rhetorical question.  Consider again the First Circuit, the 
Fourth Circuit, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rulings 
discussed above.176  Does it strike you as remotely plausible that the outcome 
of those cases would have been different if the defendant had recited, after 
the litany of recitations required at a guilty-plea hearing, that he agreed to 
waive his right to exculpatory information?  I think that the answer to that 
question is obviously “no,” and that the intuitive reason why the answer is no 
points us to a deeper point about criminal procedure waivers.  The results in 
those cases would not have changed because the government’s behavior 
would still have manifested an improper purpose.  
 
D. What’s So Special About Brady Waivers? 
 
Conditional bargains can be unconstitutional because of their 
unconstitutional purposes or their unconstitutional effects.  The argument 
why Brady waivers are unconstitutional in their effects is, more or less, made 
by Section II.D.  In that Section, I aimed to show that allowing people to 
waive their Brady rights when they plead guilty will allow the prosecutor to 
bluff—something that will increase her ability to convict the innocent, either 
by mistake or design.  This effect is unconstitutional if and only if it is 
unconstitutional to use a procedure that produces an unacceptably high rate 
of false convictions.  I discuss this below.  With respect to purpose, the 
question for Brady waivers is this: if you think that governmental purpose is 
important to understanding unconstitutional-conditions problems, what’s so 
special about Brady waivers? 
With respect to governmental purpose, let’s start by asking why a 
prosecutor might want a defendant to waive his right to exculpatory 
information.  There are many answers to this question, but I’d like to start 
with two broad strokes.  The innocent explanation is that she wants to 
minimize the pain of disclosure and wants to protect her bargain from future 
challenges on appeal.  The guilty explanation is that she wants to convict 
those whom she could not convict at trial because of the disclosure 
obligation.  
The Supreme Court has never explicitly held that innocence is a 
freestanding constitutional claim—meaning, it has never held that a state 
necessarily violates the constitution when it imprisons someone who is not 
guilty of the crime for which he was convicted.177  So, at first blush, it might 
                                                
176  Supra Part I.A. 
177  E.g., supra notes 35–40; see also Garrett, Claiming Innocence, supra note 117 
(“Most prominently, in 1993, in Herrera v. Collins, the Court narrowly failed to 
recognize a constitutional innocence claim in the context of capital cases, 
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seem that offering a bargain whose purpose and effect is to convict the 
innocent is not necessarily unconstitutional.  But this obscures the question 
by asking it at the wrong level of generality.  The lack of a freestanding 
constitutional innocence claim applies (if at all) to the individual defendant: a 
conviction does not (perhaps) violate the Constitution merely because the 
person convicted did not commit the crime, so long as his conviction was the 
result of a process that does not generate an unacceptably high rate of false 
convictions.  This is true—if for no better reason178—because the Due 
Process clause prevents the government from employing procedures that 
produce an unacceptably high rate of false deprivations of liberty.179     
The question, then, is whether the guilty or the innocent explanation of a 
prosecutor’s behavior better explains her choice to withhold a given piece of 
information, and whether her behavior produces an unacceptably high rate of 
false convictions.  The answers to these questions will depend on—and give 
me an answer to—the meaning of impeachment and materiality. 
 I have already argued that there must be some disclosure obligation out 
there.  Thus, if I find definitions of materiality and impeachment that, when 
satisfied, render the risk of false conviction unacceptably high and make 
clear that a prosecutor would not withhold the information for a 
constitutionally unproblematic reason, I have shown why Brady waivers are 
different from other waivers. 
In the next two Sections, I will argue that the structure of the problem I 
have just described leads us to sensible definitions of impeachment and 
materiality.  But in this Section, I rely on those definitions to show that 
Brady waivers are different from ordinary waivers.  Aren’t I bootstrapping?  
No.  I have already argued that there must be some disclosure obligation out 
there.  Therefore, there must be some material, exculpatory, non-
impeachment information that the prosecutor must disclose.  If I show that 
there exist definitions of materiality and impeachment that render the 
prosecutor’s motives impermissible, then I have shown that there is some 
information that cannot be bargained away.  There is no guarantee that these 
definitions of impeachment and materiality will be identical to those used in 
other areas of the law.  But the definitions that make a prosecutor’s motives 
invalid will define the scope of the non-waiveable Brady right.      
In this Section, I hope that I have convinced you that if the correct 
definitions of impeachment and materiality are chosen, the right to material, 
exculpatory, non-impeachment information cannot be waived.  This is so 
                                                                                                               
emphasizing the dual concerns of finality and reliability.”) (citing Herrera v. Collins, 
506 U.S. 390, 401, 403–04 (1993)).  
178  For a better reason, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding 
“that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 
which he is charged.”). 
179  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 
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because, under the correct definitions, (1) a prosecutor ordinarily would not 
withhold the information for any reason other than convicting someone she 
could not have convicted at trial, and (2) withholding the information 
produces an unacceptably high risk of false conviction.  In previous Sections, 
I have modeled the plea bargain to show that withholding information can 
cause the innocent to plead guilty in this context, so condition (2) is already 
satisfied to the extent that risk is severe enough to be constitutionally 
impermissible.  Now I have to give you sensible definitions of impeachment 
and materiality such that the guilty explanation for prosecutorial behavior 
prevails. 
But first, I’d like to examine what all this tells us about the structure of 
waiver doctrine in criminal procedure.  As long as you believe the 
uncontroversial proposition that evidence withheld for the purpose of 
convicting the innocent is generally more likely to convict the innocent than 
evidence withheld for convenience is, I have just argued that the prosecutor’s 
motives control the constitutionality of her actions in this context.  This is in 
tension with quite a bit of criminal procedure doctrine.  For example, the 
prosecutor’s decision to charge a defendant with a given crime is almost 
entirely unreviewable.180  Consider Wayte v. United States.181  There, the 
Justice Department prosecuted thirteen people for failing to register for the 
draft.182  An estimated 674,000 people had failed to register for the draft.183  
The thirteen who were prosecuted were among the more “vocal” opponents 
of the draft.184  It seems obvious that the government chose them, instead of 
the 673,987 other people it could have prosecuted, because of the defendants’ 
protected speech.  The Court said this was fine.185 
It might seem unusual, then, that an important piece of waiver doctrine 
hinges on why a prosecutor would seek to exact a given waiver.  But it is not 
quite as unusual as it may seem.  After all, the prosecutor’s charging decision 
is reviewable where it presents an unacceptably high risk that her choices are 
motivated by a desire to punish the defendant for the exercise of his rights.186  
Looked at from a sensible level of generality, then, prosecutors’ motives 
matter quite a bit.  And, this will be the case here.  The definitions of 
impeachment and materiality should be chosen so that, in general, 
prosecutors will withhold the information only if they are trying to convict 
                                                
180  Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“[S]o long as the 
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense 
defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file 
or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”).   
181  470 U.S. 598 (1985).  
182  Id. at 606. 
183  Id.   
184  Id. 
185  Id. at 614. 
186  E.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974).   
38       UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 15, No. 1 
 
 
someone whom they couldn’t otherwise convict.  Definitions will not be 
chosen ad hoc in response to the behavior of each prosecutor.     
 
III.  IMPEACHMENT 
 
In this Section, I define “impeachment” for the purposes of a 
prosecutor’s disclosure obligation when taking a guilty plea.  I’ve hopefully 
persuaded you that there is a disclosure obligation and that whether that 
disclosure obligation is waiveable depends on the definition of impeachment 
and materiality.  The Supreme Court in Ruiz made clear that prosecutors do 
not have to disclose impeachment evidence when a defendant pleads 
guilty.187  But what is the difference between impeachment evidence and all 
other evidence? 
Most lawyers have a good intuitive sense of the difference between 
impeachment evidence and direct evidence at trial.  When a defense witness 
testifies that someone else committed the charged crime, that isn’t 
impeachment evidence.  When a defense witness testifies that one of the 
prosecution’s witnesses testified inconsistently with something else she said, 
that is impeachment evidence.  But when the defendant pleads guilty no one 
knows whom the prosecution would have called had the case gone to trial.  
Because impeachment is generally defined in relation to the other witnesses 
at trial, when the defendant pleads guilty—and there are no witnesses at 
trial—our concept of impeachment hinges on who would have hypothetically 
testified at the trial if there had been one.  Almost any information could be 
impeachment information because the parties could always put on evidence 
that contradicts something else any witness may know.  If impeachment at 
trial is defined in relation to the other witnesses who testify at trial, this 
definition breaks down in plea bargaining, where we don’t know who else 
would testify if there were a trial. 
Ruiz describes impeachment evidence as that which “does not 
‘establish[] the factual innocence of the defendant.’”188  But what if there is 
only one witness to the crime?  Given that the background presumption is 
that the defendant is innocent, evidence that the witness is a liar surely makes 
it more likely that the defendant is innocent.  What Justice Breyer means by 
this quote,189 I think, is that impeachment information does not establish the 
defendant’s innocence by any means other than discrediting another witness. 
At least one court, and several commentators, have pointed out that this 
issue is a rather slippery one.190  The courts that apply Brady to a guilty plea 
                                                
187  United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002).  
188  Id. at 631 (internal citations omitted).   
189 Id.  
190  United States v. Danzi, 726 F. Supp. 2d 120, 127–28 (D. Conn. 2010) opinion 
clarified, 3:07 CR 305 MRK, 2010 WL 3463272 (D. Conn. Aug. 2, 2010) (“While 
the line dividing impeachment material from substantive exculpatory material may 
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post-Ruiz—and, therefore, need to distinguish between impeachment and 
non-impeachment information—often look to legal dictionaries and treatises 
to find impeachment’s meaning.191  Predictably, the definitions hinge on 
“discrediting” a witness at trial.192   But because we do not know what 
evidence a prosecutor would have put on had there been a trial, these 
definitions do not make sense in the guilty-plea context.  How can you 
discredit a witness that does not exist? 
We need something more.  Given my argument in Part II, impeachment 
ought to be defined such that it isolates the kind of information that a 
prosecutor would not withhold, unless she were trying to sucker a defendant 
into pleading guilty when he otherwise would not.  And, this question needs 
to be answered in light of Ruiz and the way the Court treated impeachment in 
that case.  
Before doing that, though, it’s worth noting here that I can’t rule out the 
possibility that “impeachment” could mean one thing relative to an 
unwaiveable disclosure right and another thing relative to a waiveable one.  
The definition I offer, given the conditions I’ve chosen to generate it, will 
isolate information the right to which cannot be waived.  That could still 
conceivably leave information to which one has a waiveable right.  Given my 
argument in Part I.A, that would be a somewhat odd result.  But it’s not 
impossible.  My definition, then, applies only to an unwaiveable right.   
As a first pass at the problem, let’s consider some of the good reasons 
prosecutors might have for failing to disclose exculpatory evidence.  They 
might want to hide the identity of a confidential source.  And, they might 
want to avoid investigating the potential evidence.  For example, imagine 
that evidence exists discrediting the truthfulness of a witness that the 
prosecution does not even care about.  Why bother investigating that?  On 
these rationales, evidence that discredits someone the prosecutor does not 
mention during plea bargaining is impeachment.  
Second, information that, were there no other witnesses at all, would tend 
to disprove the defendant’s guilt isn’t impeachment.  This seems 
uncontroversial in light of what else we know about impeachment.  And, at 
least one court has noted that where the evidence serves both to impeach and 
to reduce the likelihood of the defendant’s guilt on its own, it isn’t 
                                                                                                               
be a difficult one to draw at times—and, of course, the same piece of evidence may 
serve both purposes in appropriate circumstances . . . .”); Cassidy, supra note 21, at 
1438; Douglass, Fatal Attraction?, supra note 23, at 516. 
191  Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 153–4 (2d. Cir. 2010) (citing MUELLER & 
KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 6.75 (2010)); State v. Harris, 680 N.W.2d 737, 
745 n.9 (Wis. 2004) (citing BLACK’S LEGAL DICTIONARY 578 (7th Ed. 1999) 
(“Impeachment evidence” is defined as “[e]vidence used to undermine a witness’s 
credibility.”)); State v. Huebler, 275 P.3d 91, 96–97 (Nev. 2012) (same).    
192  3 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 6.75 
(3d ed. 2007). 
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impeachment.193  This makes sense because the prosecution likely has no 
good reason for categorically withholding this sort of information.  Perhaps 
they have tons of other evidence and do not want to bother with this—but 
that is a problem addressed chiefly under materiality. 
Finally, what to do with evidence that impeaches the credibility of a 
witness that the prosecution tells the defendant about during the bargaining 
process.  In my view, this is not impeachment, notwithstanding the fact that it 
does tend to reduce the credibility of prosecution witnesses.  In light of what 
the prosecutor does tell the defendant, she has little—if any—remaining good 
reasons for failing to tell him about those witnesses’ impeachment 
information.  And, this is the key to the rule I propose.  A prosecutor might 
have perfectly good reasons to withhold all evidence about a given case, or 
even a given element of a charged crime, in order to convince a defendant to 
plead guilty—namely, she might be trying to flush out an admission of guilt 
from a guilty defendant by forcing him to speculate on the state of her 
evidence.194  But once she starts telling the defendant about the evidence 
against him with respect to an element of the charged crime without telling 
him about evidence that discredits it, she is increasingly trying to get 
someone to plead guilty who otherwise would not because he might not be 
guilty.  And thus the rule for these cases: where the prosecutor tells the 
defendant about evidence to prove a certain element of the crime, she must 
also disclose the evidence in her possession that tends to disprove that 
element.  
The first objection to this rule is likely to be that it is a funny use of the 
word “impeachment.”  Indeed, the evidence tending to disprove the offered 
fact might well be classic impeachment evidence.  But this concern ought not 
trouble us too much given how Ruiz uses the word “impeachment”: that 
which “does not ‘establish[] the factual innocence of the defendant.’”195  The 
Court, given that statement and the factual context in which Ruiz arose, was 
likely referring to information that would discredit a witness who was not 
involved in the plea bargaining process itself.  
In Ruiz, the Court was concerned that requiring disclosure of 
impeachment information could force the government to “abandon its 
general practice of not disclosing to a defendant pleading guilty information 
that would reveal the identities of . . . prospective witnesses.”196  Similarly, 
the Court was concerned that requiring disclosure of impeachment 
information would force the government to devote “substantially more 
resources to trial preparation prior to plea bargaining.”197  Both of these 
                                                
193  In re Miranda, 182 P.3d 513, 542–43 (Cal. 2008).  
194  I quibble with the proposition that this is a “good” reason.  But it’s definitely a 
permissible one.  E.g., Easterbrook, supra note 148.    
195  United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631 (2002) (internal citation omitted). 
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197  Id. 
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concerns are advanced by limiting the meaning of “impeachment” 
information to only information that discredits witnesses on whom the 
government does not rely during the bargaining process.  Similarly, the Ruiz 
Court declined to force the government to disclose impeachment information 
because of its limited “value” as a procedural safeguard.198  Where the 
government is bluffing and impeachment information allows a defendant to 
call the bluff, the information’s value is much higher than ordinary.  
Ruiz noted that “impeachment information is special in relation to the 
fairness of a trial . . . .”199  Since the Ruiz decision, the Court has taken a 
view of plea bargaining that much more closely parallels its view of trials.200  
Rights once thought to be restricted only to trials have been extended to the 
guilty-plea process.201  And, to the extent that Ruiz rested on the unique 
characteristics of impeachment information in relation to the trial process—
impeachment, after all, is currently defined in relation to other trial 
testimony—the rule I just proposed serves to isolate the analogous functions 
that information has in the plea bargaining process.  Inculpatory trial 
testimony is analogous to information the prosecutor uses to convince 
someone he will be convicted.  
Finally, one might object that the rule poses significant administrability 
concerns.  (Set aside whether this is a legitimate objection.)  How are we 
going to know what the prosecutor did or did not tell the defendant during 
the plea-bargaining process? That seems like a pain.  But the Court in 
Cooper and Frye made clear that those concerns must yield, as a general 
matter, to the overall fairness of the bargaining process.  In those cases, the 
Court held that a defendant is prejudiced for ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel purposes whenever he receives a worse plea bargain than he would 
have received had he been assisted by competent counsel.  Determining 
whether a Cooper violation has occurred—and, assuming it has, what the 
appropriate remedy is—requires a detailed inquiry into who offered what to 
whom and when (and even why).202  If the Court is comfortable with that 
inquiry, there is no reason to believe it shouldn’t be comfortable with this 
one.  Indeed, the Court might be comfortable with this hearing because trial 
courts will be conducting Cooper hearings anyway. 
                                                
198  Id. at 631. 
199  Id. at 629.  
200  E.g., Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“To a large extent . . . 
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All this is not to say that the rule is without complications.  One of the 
foremost complications stems from the police.  The police are part of the 
prosecution team, and their actions are imputed to the government, generally 
speaking, for Brady purposes.203  Imagine, then, that the police give the 
defendant a copy of the police report, which contains many facts.  Need the 
prosecution disclose all those facts that tend to disprove anything in the 
report?  To the extent that those facts are material and that the government is 
in possession of evidence that is inconsistent with them, the answer is yes.          
         
IV.  MATERIALITY 
 
A brief word about materiality.  Brady covers only “material” 
information.204  Where a defendant goes to trial, materiality is defined as 
information that “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a 
different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”205  This looks at 
the problem, more or less, from the perspective of the jury.  But what about 
when the defendant pleads guilty?  Several courts have imported the standard 
for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims that result in pleas of guilty, 
explained by the Court in Hill v. Lockhart.206  This standard asks whether 
there is “a reasonable probability that, but for [the ineffective advice], [the 
defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going 
to trial.”207  This standard focuses on the defendant.  
I owe you a definition of materiality.  My argument in Part II was 
premised on selecting an appropriate definition such that the standard for 
these claims separates out those bargains for which the prosecutor’s purposes 
are kosher from those where they are not.  The standard, then, should focus, 
at least in part, on the prosecutor.  The question ought to be whether the 
information is such that a reasonable prosecutor would withhold it only 
where her purpose is to convince a defendant to plead guilty where he 
otherwise would not.   
But my argument in Part II was two-fold.  The definition of materiality 
ought to separate out bargains on the basis of both purpose and effect.  So the 
appropriate definition of materiality in this context looks both to why the 
prosecutor withheld the information (purpose) and what the defendant would 
have done with it had he seen it (effect).  This sounds awfully cumbersome.  
It’s not.  I think this usually collapses to one question.  A prosecutor would 
withhold information for the purpose of convincing someone to plead guilty 
                                                
203  Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 421–22 (1995).  
204  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
205  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 421.   
206  E.g., Commonwealth v. Scott, 5 N.E.3d 530, 546 n.12 (Mass. 2014) (citing 
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whom she otherwise could not convince only where she thinks that the 
information would have caused him not to plead guilty had he known it.  The 
Hill standard, after all, does not look to “the idiosyncrasies of the particular 
decision-maker.”208  Neither should the standard here.  Because individual 
motives are ordinarily impossible to divine, this is the sensible level of 
generality at which to assess motives.  The only evidence that would meet 
the standard, would make a typical defendant choose not to plead guilty.  A 
prosecutor generally can predict the behavior of a hypothetical typical 
defendant.  
Thus, for the most part, the standard in Hill works for this purpose, with 
one potential refinement.  Hill speaks of a defendant “insist[ing] on going to 
trial.”209  But, after Frye, it is clear that ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims are cognizable where the defendant rejects a favorable plea offer and 
accepts a less favorable one.  Thus, the standard here ought to ask whether 
the defendant would have rejected the bargain and insisted either on trial or a 
materially better bargain.  Difficult questions will likely arise—what’s 
“materially” better?—but those questions will arise under Frye regardless.  
 
CONCLUSION—WHAT DOES PLEADING “GUILTY” MEAN? 
 
I hope I’ve convinced you that, on a proper understanding of criminal 
procedure, defendants have an unwaiveable right to disclosure of material 
exculpatory information when they plead guilty.  I hope I’ve offered 
satisfying definitions of impeachment and materiality that accord with the 
purposes underlying the rule.  And, I hope I’ve shown you that the rule 
requiring disclosure despite a defendant’s would-be waiver is an important 
one. 
But what does all this say about the meaning of a guilty plea?  First, as I 
mentioned above, I think it points to the crucial role of prosecutorial purpose 
in the guilty-plea process.  But it also says something about defendants.  The 
analysis above relies on the principle that defendants plead guilty not only 
because they are guilty, but rather because many must plead guilty in order to 
reach an equitable outcome—or to try to reach one—in the criminal process.  
Realistically, there is no doubt that this is true in practice.210  And, 
arguments to the contrary are often silly.211  But the law has been slow to 
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what law is about.”).   
44       UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 15, No. 1 
 
 
accept the reality.212  This dichotomy plays out in the way that courts and 
scholars conceive of the information asymmetry between defendants and 
prosecutors.  Some scholars continue to believe that plea bargaining serves as 
a reliable means of separating the guilty and the innocent because the 
innocent know they’re innocent and won’t plead guilty; the guilty know 
they’re guilty and will.  Other scholars are increasingly attuned to the reality 
that process costs can dominate the plea-bargaining process, and can force an 
innocent defendant to plead guilty.  If this is true—it is—then the meaningful 
information asymmetry in plea bargaining must run in favor of the 
prosecutor.  Although the defendant may know whether or not he is guilty in 
a spiritual and in a factual sense, the prosecutor knows what evidence will be 
put on in the courtroom.   
Damages actions for wrongful imprisonment offer an interesting angle 
on this disconnect.  In some states, the wrongfully convicted are entitled by 
statute to damages from the state.213  But the law has been confused about 
what to do with defendants who falsely pleaded guilty.  On the one hand, 
some courts hold that a guilty plea is just that: an admission of guilt.214  But 
other courts are coming around to the view that a guilty plea—even though it 
involves a defendant’s sworn declaration that he is, in fact, guilty—does not 
mean that the pleader is conclusively guilty for all purposes.215  Hopefully, 
the above discussion will show that the law already understands this reality at 
a certain level and, hopefully again, that will point other parts of the doctrine 
in the right direction. 
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